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A N D R E W  H A M M O N D  
Pleading Poverty in Federal Court 
abstract.  What must a poor person plead to gain access to the federal courts? How do courts 
decide when a poor litigant is poor enough? This Article answers those questions with the ﬁrst 
comprehensive study of how district courts determine when a litigant may proceed in forma pau-
peris in a civil lawsuit. It shows that district courts lack standards to determine a litigant’s poverty 
and often require litigants to answer an array of questions to little effect. As a result, discrepancies 
in federal practice abound—across and within district courts—and produce a pleading system that 
is arbitrary, inefficient, and invasive. 
 The Article makes four contributions. First, it codes all the poverty pleadings currently used 
by the ninety-four federal district courts. Second, it shows that the ﬂaws of these procedures are 
neither inevitable nor characteristic of poverty determinations. By comparing federal practice to 
other federal means tests and state-court practices, the Article demonstrates that a more stream-
lined, yet rights-respecting approach is possible. Third, the Article proposes a coherent in forma 
pauperis standard—one that would align federal practice with federal law, promote reasoned judi-
cial administration, and protect the dignity of litigants. Such a solution proves that judges need 
not choose between extending access to justice and preserving court resources. In this instance and 
perhaps others, judges can serve both commitments of the federal system. Fourth, the Article il-
lustrates how to study procedure from the bottom up. Given the persistent and widening levels of 
inequality in American society, no account of civil procedure is complete without an understanding 
of how poor people litigate today. 
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introduction 
In a nation racked with persistent poverty and increasing inequality, it is 
worth asking how the federal courts encounter and accommodate litigants with 
limited means. Almost forty million Americans live below the federal poverty 
level.
1
 Forty percent of American adults report not having the savings to cover a 
$400 emergency—the same amount it costs to ﬁle a case in federal court.
2
 Yet, 
these ﬁnancial realities for low-income litigants collide with a civil justice system 
that demands that those individuals act as their own advocates. The federal 
courts constitute an indispensable forum for low-income individuals. They hear 
thousands of cases involving alleged unlawful practices by the employers and 
government actors with whom poor people interact on a regular basis. Indeed, 
employment discrimination, police misconduct, and disability determinations 
make up a signiﬁcant portion of the federal question cases in the federal courts.
3
 
Given that American civil justice largely relies on private enforcement of funda-
mental rights, we should not lose sight of procedural rules that only apply to 
poor litigants. Procedural rules may impinge on the ability of litigants to vindi-
cate their claims, especially those arising under the Constitution and the laws of 
the United States. Mindful of those stakes, this Article works through the ﬁrst 
rule that poor people encounter when they ﬁle a lawsuit in federal court. 
Since 1892, Congress has authorized the federal courts to grant in forma pau-
peris (IFP) status to litigants who submit a ﬁnancial affidavit declaring their 
poverty. Yet, the regime now in place—governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 83—affords federal judges broad discretion to deter-
mine whether a litigant qualiﬁes for IFP status. As a result, the manner in which 
people plead poverty in federal court varies dramatically across the federal sys-
tem. This pleading structure burdens judges and litigants, and it differs from the 
 
1. Kayla Fontenot et al., Income and Poverty in the United States: 2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 11 
(Sept. 2018), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018
/demo/p60-263.pdf [https://perma.cc/EBE8-SSY8]. The poverty threshold in 2017 was an 
annual income of $24,858 for a family of four including two children. See id. at 47. Poverty 
rates among African Americans and Latinos are about twice those of white Americans. See id. 
at 12. 
2. Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2017, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. 
SYS. 21 (May 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/ﬁles/2017-report 
-economic-well-being-us-households-201805.pdf [https://perma.cc/XT6W-GCA7]. 
3. Of the 267,769 cases ﬁled in the federal trial courts in ﬁscal year 2017, twenty-two percent of 
cases were brought under the Social Security Act or civil rights statutes, including the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act, § 1983, and Title VII. See Table 4.4: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases 
Filed, by Nature of Suit, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. 1-2, 4 (2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites
/default/ﬁles/data_tables/jff_4.4_0930.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AT6-LYGB]. 
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poverty determinations conducted by federal agencies, state agencies, and state 
courts. 
This Article builds its argument from the ground up by tracing the disparate 
IFP practices of the United States’ ninety-four federal trial courts. Drawing on 
both federal law and state-court practice, the Article proposes a coherent IFP 
standard. It connects this inquiry with broader debates in procedure, including 
those around access to justice and the future of civil adjudication. More broadly, 
this Article typiﬁes what one might call bottom-up procedural scholarship. Such 
an approach will often prioritize poor litigants over wealthy ones, trial courts 
over appellate, and routine adjudications over precedent-shattering rulings. 
The Article begins by identifying and documenting the range of federal in 
forma pauperis practice. In granting IFP status, the federal court waives the ini-
tial ﬁling fee and sometimes confers other beneﬁts on the litigant, including as-
sistance effectuating service of process and even appointed counsel.
4
 Beyond 
these concrete beneﬁts, IFP status instantiates the federal system’s purported 
commitment not to let a litigant’s indigence interfere with the merits of that lit-
igant’s claims. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), as well as the tradition of local rules 
and court practices enabled by the Federal Rules, gives judges signiﬁcant discre-
tion in determining whether a litigant’s poverty warrants IFP status. That dis-
cretion, in turn, has produced a dizzying degree of variation across and within 
the ninety-four U.S. district courts. 
In forma pauperis motions do not equip federal judges with the tools to ac-
curately assess a movant’s poverty,
5
 and federal courts differ in the information 
they collect about litigants’ ﬁnancial situations. Part I demonstrates how this lack 
of uniformity across and within courts creates disparate practices in the federal 
judiciary.
6
 The coding summarized in Part I highlights these differences, with 
many forms requiring more information than necessary. 
Also, few federal courts provide back-end guidance for judges presented with 
an in forma pauperis motion. With no standard ex ante, judges are left to deter-
mine how much income is too low, how many expenses are too high, and how 
many assets are too few.
7
 Moreover, computing a movant’s income and expenses 
is arithmetic and does not demand the skills of an Article III judge. 
As for the litigants, the federal courts unnecessarily ask poor people to plead 
too much to prove their poverty. Some of the IFP forms betray a wealthy person’s 
conception of income—asking would-be litigants to appraise their jewelry and 
 
4. See infra Part I. 
5. Throughout the Article, I use the terminology of “movant” or “litigant” rather than “plaintiff” 
or “defendant.” 
6. See infra Part I. 
7. Id. 
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artwork, to divulge their stock holdings, and to itemize their inheritances. A poor 
litigant should not need to plead the make and model of any vehicle in their pos-
session or disclose their educational attainment. A judge need not require, as one 
of the forms used by the Judicial Conference of the United States does, a litigant 
to list income from a dozen categories, ﬁfteen types of expenses, and ten types 
of assets. Such a cumbersome, standardless pleading system needlessly burdens 
judges and litigants. 
Part II disproves that this degree of unreliability is inherent in poverty plead-
ings. Indeed, one cannot fully appreciate the ﬂaws in federal practice until sur-
veying the landscape of poverty determinations outside of the federal courts. By 
comparing federal IFP determinations to other poverty determinations, the Ar-
ticle illustrates that federal practice need not be so arbitrary. Federal and state 
agencies routinely determine the poverty of applicants.
8
 These agencies apply 
means tests to determine whether an individual or family is eligible for govern-
ment assistance, including Medicaid, food assistance, and welfare.
9
 Federal 
courts should follow suit. To be sure, it is unusual to liken federal courts to wel-
fare agencies, but in this context, both institutions are engaged in an identical 
enterprise—attempting to distribute a means-tested beneﬁt in a rational, effi-
cient manner. The constitutional origins and distinct functions of courts and 
agencies should not prevent us from comparing how they make those poverty 
determinations. 
For those who would prefer to compare federal courts only to other courts, 
state court systems serve as ready-made analogs. State courts use a variety of 
mechanisms to make poverty determinations.
10
 In fact, these courts use rules 
similar to those of human-services agencies that the federal courts should also 
adopt. For example, some state courts already use bright-line income tests tied 
to the federal poverty guidelines and adjunctive eligibility (i.e., qualifying for 
one program as a presumption of qualiﬁcation for another). These agency and 
state-court practices highlight the rudimentary nature of our federal system. 
Part III draws on these lessons from federal law and state-court practice to 
propose a coherent federal IFP standard. This national standard would not only 
bring IFP status in line with federal law and state-court practice but also better 
promote access to justice for poor people. It would build on the lessons of other 
 
8. See infra Part II. 
9. See, e.g., Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Program, & Basic Health Program Eligibility Lev-
els, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/program-information/medicaid 
-and-chip-eligibility-levels/index.html [https://perma.cc/XVU6-6JZK]; Food & Nutrition 
Serv., Am I Eligible for SNAP?, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. tbl.1, https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap 
/eligibility [https://perma.cc/7AH4-QGUT]. 
10. See infra Part II. 
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poverty determinations by clarifying an income threshold and allowing for ad-
junctive eligibility.
11
 Federal judges could save valuable time by streamlining this 
fairly ministerial function, and the new IFP standard would preserve their dis-
cretion in cases where the court determines that paying the fees and costs would 
cause the litigant substantial hardship. To adopt the new standard, Congress 
could amend the federal IFP statute, the Judicial Conference could amend the 
Federal Rules or propose a new form, or individual district courts could imple-
ment the new standard. While there are potential drawbacks to a uniform na-
tional standard, including that it could stiﬂe variation based on regional differ-
ences in costs of living, the proposal advanced in this Article would reduce the 
arbitrary qualities of federal IFP determinations in ways that beneﬁt judges and 
litigants alike. 
Beyond the details of federal IFP practice, much procedure scholarship con-
siders additional protections for poor litigants (and access-to-justice reforms 
generally) to be at odds with the demands of efficient judicial administration. 
Due process values are understood to be in conﬂict with preserving judicial re-
sources. In Part IV, the Article shows why the trade-off between procedural pro-
tections and judicial resources is not preordained.
12
 It suggests that these prin-
ciples should not always be treated as “either/or” design choices, but rather as 
mutually reinforcing features that legitimize a procedural system.
13
 The Article 
reconciles this seeming conﬂict in a speciﬁc instance: a poor litigant’s ﬁrst step 
into federal court. 
In the process, the Article models a different approach to the study of proce-
dure. By concentrating on an admittedly obscure procedure, the Article stresses 
the lived reality for litigants when they seek redress in federal court. In doing so, 
this project emphasizes not the appellate courts of the federal system but rather 
the trial courts that are, for most, the face of justice. The Article dwells on one of 
the run-of-the-mill procedures that litigants encounter every day in the federal 
system. Put simply, this is procedure not from the top down but from the bottom 
up. 
The Article makes its case in four parts. Part I uncovers the major ﬂaws in 
current in forma pauperis practice in federal court. By collecting and coding all 
IFP forms currently in use in the U.S. district courts, the Article shows how these 
IFP determinations are irrational, inefficient, and invasive. Part II demonstrates 
that the problems in federal practice are not inevitable in a large court system or 
even characteristic of poverty determinations. Federal law contains other poverty 
determinations that are more straightforward than current IFP practice. State 
 
11. See infra Part III. 
12. See infra Part IV. 
13. See infra Section IV.B. 
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courts also offer useful guidance for the federal system. Part III proposes a new 
standard, one that would bring IFP determinations in line with federal law and 
better promote access to justice for poor Americans. The Article lays out how 
Congress, the Judicial Conference of the United States, or individual district 
courts could adopt this proposal. Part IV connects the challenges associated with 
federal practice in this area to the longstanding conversation among procedural-
ists about balancing the need to protect access to the courts for indigent litigants 
and the need for rationalized judicial resources. The Article concludes with an 
exploration of how this scholarship informs the study of civil procedure, sug-
gesting that those litigants who have few resources may have the most to teach 
us about how adjudicatory systems function (or fail to) in our inegalitarian age. 
i .  in forma pauperis practice in federal court 
What must a poor person plead for a federal court to waive fees and costs? 
How poor must that person be? Common law courts have long possessed the 
authority to waive fees and costs for indigent litigants, and Congress has author-
ized federal courts to do so for 125 years.
14
 The precise practices that have 
emerged from that authority warrant a comprehensive study.
15
 This Part begins 
 
14. See infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text. The ﬁrst question listed on the federal judiciary’s 
website deals with in forma pauperis practices: 
[Question:] How do I ﬁle a civil case? Is there a charge? 
[Answer:] A civil action is commenced by the ﬁling of a complaint. Parties 
instituting a civil action in a district court are required to pay a ﬁling fee pursuant 
to Title 28, U.S. Code, Section 1914. The current fee is $350. Complaints may be 
accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis, meaning that the 
plaintiff is incapable of paying the ﬁling fee. Proceedings in forma pauperis are gov-
erned by Title 28, U.S. Code, Section 1915. 
FAQs: Filing a Case, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/faqs-ﬁling-case 
[https://perma.cc/3D5Q-8XMS]. 
15. The only two relevant reports from the Federal Judicial Center are from 1984 and 1994; they 
deal with whether district courts allow prisoners and other IFP litigants to pay partial ﬁling 
fees. See MARIE CORDISCO, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PARTIAL PAYMENT OF FILING FEES IN IN FORMA 
PAUPERIS CASES: CURRENT PRACTICES OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1994) (detailing “the 
current practice in each United States District Court regarding the imposition of partial ﬁling 
fees”); THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PARTIAL PAYMENT OF FILING FEES IN PRIS-
ONER IN FORMA PAUPERIS CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (1984) (focus-
ing on the Northern District of Ohio’s practices). To be sure, such an effort is considerably 
easier now that nearly all district courts make their local forms available on their respective 
court websites. Legal scholars have discussed in forma pauperis practice, but these articles 
were published anywhere from thirty to one hundred years ago, and none systematically an-
alyzed federal practice in the district courts. See, e.g., Robert S. Catz & Thad M. Guyer, Federal 
In Forma Pauperis Litigation: In Search of Judicial Standards, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 655, 656 (1978) 
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by sketching the historical context of the modern federal in forma pauperis stat-
ute. It touches brieﬂy on the IFP regime in the United Kingdom before moving 
to the federal IFP statute in the United States. It then details the beneﬁts that 
currently ﬂow from this status. The bulk of the Part, however, relates the results 
of a survey of the ninety-four federal district courts’ current IFP forms and prac-
tices. 
A. The History of In Forma Pauperis Status in Federal Court 
Although this Article focuses on the federal statutory regime of in forma pau-
peris in the United States, special treatment of poor litigants was a feature of 
common law legal systems long before the federal statute was ﬁrst enacted in 
1892.
16
 This historical background underscores the longstanding aspiration for 
courts to furnish a procedural system that does not distinguish between the rich 
and the poor. 
There is some evidence that at common law there was a right to sue regard-
less of ability to pay and that statutes merely regulated the right of an indigent 
to sue.
17
 Regardless of its provenance, though, the in forma pauperis right in 
England can claim uncontested authority since 1495.
18
 In effect for four centu-
ries, England’s in forma pauperis statute absolved a plaintiff of paying the typical 
 
(describing federal practice as “both diffuse and inconsistent”); Ben. C. Duniway, The Poor 
Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1270 (1966); Stephen M. Feldman, Indigents in the 
Federal Courts: The In Forma Pauperis Statute—Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 413, 
414 (1985); John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361 
(1923); Lee Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in 
Civil Cases, 2 VAL. U. L. REV. 21 (1967); Comment on Recent Case, Procedure: Suits In Forma 
Pauperis, 6 CALIF. L. REV. 226 (1918). More current writing on in forma pauperis practice in 
the federal and the state courts can be found in bar journals. See, e.g., Regan Strickland Beatty, 
Access to the Bankruptcy Courts: The In Forma Pauperis Provision, 85 OKLA. B.J. 822 (2014); 
Christian J. Grostic, An Indigent Plaintiff in the Federal Courts, FED. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 2014, at 70; 
Christine E. Rollins, Statutory Assistance for Attorneys Providing Pro Bono Services, 60 J. MO. B. 
112 (2004). Justice Douglas discussed federal in forma pauperis practice in such a journal 
nearly sixty years ago. William O. Douglas, In Forma Pauperis Practice in the United States, N.H. 
B.J., Oct. 1959, at 5, 6 (explaining why “the pauper is entitled to the beneﬁts of all of the 
court’s processes”). 
16. See generally Maguire, supra note 15, at 362-65 (discussing in forma pauperis status in the An-
glo-American legal tradition). 
17. See Brunt v. Wardle (1841) 133 Eng. Rep. 1254, 1257 (“[A]fter all, is the 11 H[en]. 7, c. 12 any 
thing more than conﬁrmatory of the common law?”); see also 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 192 (A. Wood Renton & Max A. Robertson eds., 2d ed. 1907) (describing early 
recognition of the “common-law right” to proceed in forma pauperis). 
18. See An Acte to Admytt Such P[er]sons as Are Poore to Sue In Forma Paup[er]is 1495, 11 Hen. 
7 c. 12 [hereinafter Acte to Admytt]. 
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fees and costs associated with a lawsuit.
19
 A plaintiff had to submit documenta-
tion to the court from two attorneys certifying that his suit had merit.
20
 Starting 
in the 1880s, in forma pauperis practice was enshrined in court rules. In 1949, 
the British Parliament created what aspired to be a comprehensive system of le-
gal aid and, in the process, abolished the right to litigate in forma pauperis.
21
 
In 1892, the U.S. Congress passed the ﬁrst statute authorizing the federal 
courts to allow plaintiffs to proceed in forma pauperis. The statute provided that 
“any citizen of the United States, entitled to commence any suit or action in any 
court of the United States, may commence and prosecute to conclusion any such 
suit or action without being required to prepay fees or costs, or give security 
therefor” if the plaintiff submitted an affidavit that “because of his poverty, he is 
unable to pay the costs” and that his case has merit.
22
 The statute required that 
the court’s officers would serve process in these cases and authorized the court 
to request an attorney “to represent such poor person, if it deem[ed] the cause 
 
19. This is not to say that there were no other costs to the indigent litigant. At common law, a 
pauper who lost his case could be whipped. See An Acte that the Defendunt Shall Recov[er] 
Cost[s] Ageinste the Pleyntif, if the P[lain]t[iff ] Be Nonsuited, or if the V[er]dicte Passe 
Ageinste Him 1532, 23 Hen. 8 c. 15 (noting that indigent litigants “shall suffer other pu-
nysshement as by the discrecion of the Justices or Judge afore whome suche suities shall de-
pende, shalbe thought reasonable”). 
20. Acte to Admytt, supra note 18. The statute of 1495 did not apply to civil defendants. Id.; see 
also COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND LEGAL ADVICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES, REPORT, [Cmd.] 
6641 (1945) (discussing British in forma pauperis practice); Alex Elson, The Rushcliffe Report, 
13 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 142 (1946) (“[T]he signiﬁcance of the Rushcliffe report is that the bar 
of England at this time is willing to consider the need for legal assistance as a fundamental 
problem requiring immediate national consideration.”). 
21. The Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51 (abolishing in forma pauperis status 
“in respect of proceedings in all courts in England and Wales except the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council”); see also Richard I. Morgan, The Introduction of Civil Legal Aid in England 
and Wales, 1914-1949, 5 TWENTIETH CENTURY BRIT. HIST. 38 (1994) (describing the creation 
of the legal aid system). 
22. Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, § 1, 27 Stat. 252, 252. Federal courts sitting in admiralty developed 
an analog to in forma pauperis status before the 1892 statute. Typically made available to sea-
men suing for wages, this procedure allowed litigants to proceed upon a juratory caution, 
which permitted sailors to avoid the court fee. See, e.g., The Arctic, 1 F. Cas. 1089 (E.D. Mich. 
1871) (No. 509A); The Great Britain, 10 F. Cas. 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1843) (No. 5736); see also 
Maguire, supra note 15, at 381 n.102 (collecting admiralty cases that “without the aid of statute, 
bore the English stamp in the matter of poor persons’ proceedings”); Comment on Recent 
Case, supra note 15, at 227-28 (discussing admiralty practice). Congress enacted a statutory 
right in such cases in 1948. See 28 U.S.C. § 1916 (2018) (authorizing seamen to “institute and 
prosecute suits and appeals in their own names and for their own beneﬁt for wages or salvage 
or the enforcement of laws enacted for their health or safety without prepaying fees or costs 
or furnishing security therefor”). 
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worthy of a trial.”
23
 To guard against false statements and frivolous cases, the 
statute also authorized courts to dismiss any case if “the allegation of poverty is 
untrue, or if said court be satisﬁed that the alleged cause of action is frivolous or 
malicious,” and it made a fraudulent in forma pauperis statement punishable as 
perjury.
24
 
The House Report for the eventual statute suggests that Congress wanted to 
ensure that indigent plaintiffs possessed the same procedural rights as plaintiffs 
who could afford to pay the fees and costs of litigation.
25
 The Report described 
the legislation as an attempt to solve the problem where “persons with honest 
claims may be defeated, and doubtless often are, by wealthy adversaries.”
26
 The 
legislative history also suggests that Congress wanted to “keep pace” with states 
that had adopted similar policies.
27
 
While Congress focused on providing poor people with initial entry to the 
federal courts, it did not consider whether courts could recoup the waived fees 
and costs in the event of the plaintiff’s recovery. Federal courts were left to inter-
pret the statute and its eventual amendments.
28
 Over the next century, the courts 
wrestled with several questions, including whether in forma pauperis status was 
a mandatory or discretionary beneﬁt conferred by the court, how to penalize 
fraudulent claims to this status, and which litigants in which proceedings could 
plead that status. 
As to the ﬁrst of these questions, federal courts are not required to grant in 
forma pauperis status. Rather, the decision to grant a litigant’s motion is in the 
court’s discretion. In Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., the Supreme Court held 
that judges are not required to grant requests for assistance in forma pauperis 
because the statute merely conferred the authority to do so when the claim was 
“sufficiently meritorious to justify the . . . request.”
29
 
 
23. Act of July 20, 1892, § 4, 27 Stat. at 252. 
24. Id. 
25. See H.R. REP. NO. 52-1079, at 1 (1892).  
26. Id. 
27. See id.; see also Comment on Recent Case, supra note 15. Earlier decisions from some state 
supreme courts held that the right to proceed in forma pauperis derived from statute. See, e.g., 
Hoey v. McCarthy, 24 N.E. 1038 (Ind. 1890); Campbell v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 23 Wis. 490 
(1868). 
28. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989) (discussing how “[t]he brevity of § 1915(d) 
and the generality of its terms have left the judiciary with the not inconsiderable tasks of fash-
ioning the procedures by which the statute operates and of giving content to § 1915(d)’s in-
deﬁnite adjectives,” including “frivolous”). 
29. 236 U.S. 43, 45 (1915). 
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Furthermore, since the federal statute was enacted, Congress has authorized 
the federal courts to dismiss claims ﬁled in forma pauperis if the action is frivo-
lous or malicious. The Supreme Court reasoned in Neitzke v. Williams that a lit-
igant who bore no costs also lacked “an economic incentive to refrain from ﬁling 
frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.”
30
 However, aside from dismissal of 
the suit, the only potential sanctions for a fraudulent in forma pauperis affidavit 
are prosecution for perjury and assessment of costs.
31
 The statute further pro-
vides that “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines 
that . . . the allegation of poverty is untrue.”
32
 Mistakes made in good faith can-
not save an erring movant.
33
 
Congress has amended the federal IFP statute several times since 1892, ex-
tending the status to defendants,
34
 appellants,
35
 and noncitizens.
36
 It has also 
 
30. 490 U.S. at 324; see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27 (1992); Zatko v. California, 502 
U.S. 16, 16-17 (1991) (per curiam) (airing the concern that “in forma pauperis petitioners lack 
the ﬁnancial disincentives—ﬁling fees and attorney’s fees—that help to deter other litigants 
from ﬁling frivolous petitions”). Others have explored the extent to which lawyers have an 
obligation to represent clients who cannot afford to pay them. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, The 
Enigma of the Lawyer’s Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735 (1980). 
31. See Adkins v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 338-39 (1948) (identifying perjury 
prosecutions as “a sanction important in protection of the public against a false or fraudulent 
invocation of the statute’s beneﬁts” and discussing “other sanctions to protect against false 
affidavits” including authorizing courts to dismiss the case and “render judgment for costs”); 
Pothier v. Rodman, 261 U.S. 307 (1923). Admittedly, it is difficult to ﬁnd perjury prosecutions 
for fraudulent in forma pauperis applications in published opinions of the federal courts. 
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A) (2018); see, e.g., Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 
305, 306 (7th Cir. 2002) (interpreting § 1915(e)(2)(A) as mandatory, requiring that once “the 
allegation of poverty [is proven] false, the suit ha[s] to be dismissed; the judge ha[s] no 
choice”). 
33. See, e.g., Osoria v. AT&T Co., No. 11-cv-4296,  2013 WL 4501450, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2013) 
(dismissing the case after discovering that the plaintiff did not list assets on her IFP applica-
tion, despite her argument that she misunderstood the application). 
34. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 435, § 1, 36 Stat. 866, 866. 
35. Id. 
36. Act of Sept. 21, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-320, 73 Stat. 590; see also Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 
506 U.S. 194, 198 n.2 (1993) (discussing the legislative history that cited the Judicial Confer-
ence’s concern that the “distinction between citizens and aliens as contained in existing law 
may be unconstitutional” and also “in violation of various treaties entered into by the United 
States with foreign countries which guarantee[] to their citizens access of the courts of the 
United States.”). In Rowland, the Supreme Court held that “only a natural person may qualify 
for treatment in forma pauperis under § 1915.” 506 U.S. at 196. 
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provided that the federal government would pay for records in criminal appeals
37
 
as well as transcript fees in civil and criminal appeals.
38
 
One issue left unaddressed by these reforms concerned the status of bank-
ruptcy courts. Federal courts disagreed as to whether a bankruptcy court was a 
“court of the United States” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and there-
fore had the power to grant a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
39
 Those that 
held that in forma pauperis status did not apply to bankruptcy proceedings relied 
on United States v. Kras.
40
 There, the Supreme Court held that, despite the IFP 
statute, all parties were required to pay commencement fees for ﬁling a petition 
for bankruptcy.
41
 In 2005, however, Congress authorized a district or bankruptcy 
court to waive ﬁling and other fees in personal bankruptcy cases for individuals 
who are unable to pay.
42
 As will be discussed below, in creating this parallel fee-
waiver provision for Chapter 7 debtors, Congress set an income threshold of 
150% of the federal poverty line.
43
 
While this Article’s focus is on nonprisoner civil litigation, it is worth brieﬂy 
detailing the only time that Congress restricted IFP status in prison litigation. In 
1996, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
44
 citing the 
 
37. Act of June 27, 1922, ch. 246, 42 Stat. 666. 
38. Act of Jan. 20, 1944, ch. 3, 58 Stat. 5. 
39. Compare In re Perroton, 958 F.2d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that a bankruptcy 
court is not a “court of the United States” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)), with In re 
McGinnis, 155 B.R. 294, 294 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993) (collecting bankruptcy cases granting in 
forma pauperis status to Chapter 7 debtors). 
40. 409 U.S. 434 (1973). 
41. Id. at 440-45 (distinguishing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) on the grounds that a 
bankruptcy proceeding, unlike a divorce action, does not involve a fundamental interest); see 
also, e.g., Henry Rose, Denying the Poor Access to Court: United States v. Kras (1973), in THE 
POVERTY LAW CANON 188, 191-96 (Marie A. Failinger & Ezra Rosser eds., 2016) (detailing the 
disagreement within the Supreme Court as to the application of Boddie); Judith Resnik, Fair-
ness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rog-
ers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 86 (2011) (characterizing Boddie as the Supreme Court failing to 
guarantee access for “all poor civil litigants” and instead “identif[ying] a narrow band (largely 
in family conﬂicts) . . . garnering constitutional entitlements to government subsidies to use 
courts”). 
42. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 
Stat. 23 (2005). 
43. Id. § 418, 119 Stat. at 109. 
44. Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 1321, 1366 (1995); see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 
(2007) (“Prisoner litigation continues to ‘account for an outsized share of ﬁlings’ in federal 
district courts.” (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 94 n.4 (2006))). See generally Margo 
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003) (laying out the scope and history 
of prison litigation in the federal system). 
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tide of “substantively meritless prisoner claims that have swamped the federal 
courts.”
45
 Congress enacted the PLRA to “ﬁlter out the bad claims and facilitate 
consideration of the good.”
46
 The statute was designed “to reduce the quantity 
and improve the quality of prisoner suits.”
47
 Yet in addition to an administrative 
exhaustion requirement
48
 and a “three strikes” rule to limit lawsuits brought by 
prisoners who had a track record of frivolous cases,
49
 the PLRA created a “pre-
screening” regime.
50
 As drafted, that regime threatened to upend longstanding 
federal practice for prisoner and nonprisoner litigants alike. As amended by the 
PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) now reads: 
[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, 
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, 
or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a 
person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets 
such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give 
security therefor.
51
 
The insertion of the word “prisoner” raised the issue of whether Congress in-
tended to restrict in forma pauperis proceedings only to incarcerated persons. 
Given that the PLRA was intended to limit prisoner litigation, reading the text 
literally would create the odd result that prisoners could ﬁle cases without pre-
payments of fees, but nonprisoners could not. As a result, courts have considered 
this a scrivener’s error.
52
 
 
45. Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2000) (emphasis omitted) (discussing the legislative 
history of the PLRA). 
46. Bock, 549 U.S. at 204. 
47. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). 
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2018) (barring a prisoner’s suit “until such administrative remedies as 
are available are exhausted”). 
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2018); Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 2013) (illustrating 
how courts apply the “three strikes” rule); Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 314 (3d Cir. 
2001) (en banc) (“It is important to note that § 1915(g) does not block a prisoner’s access to 
the federal courts. It only denies the prisoner the privilege of ﬁling before he has acquired the 
necessary ﬁling fee.”). 
50. Under the PLRA, federal courts are required to dismiss an action or appeal sua sponte if the 
action is “frivolous” or “malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or 
“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). 
51. Id. § 1915(a)(1). 
52. See, e.g., Floyd v. USPS, 105 F.3d 274, 275 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled in part by Callihan v. 
Schneider, 178 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 1999). The PLRA’s legislative history indicates that Con-
gress amended the act to limit prisoners’ access to pro se ﬁlings and that Congress had not 
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The federal courts continue to wrestle with how to interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1915 
in light of the PLRA.
53
 Prisoners who litigate in federal court face barriers apart 
from IFP determinations. Such barriers, as well as the prisoners’ IFP determina-
tions, are worthy of more study, but to include them in this Article would mud-
dle its analysis of federal civil practice. As a result, this Article’s analysis applies 
to prisoner litigants only insofar as it discusses barriers that both prisoner and 
nonprisoner litigants face, including having to plead one’s poverty. 
The history of IFP practice in the United Kingdom and the United States 
suggests that these common law systems have consistently sought some proce-
dural mechanism to reduce the likelihood that a litigant’s lack of resources im-
pinges on that person’s ability to press their case in court. Indeed, both of these 
countries’ court systems have sought to use IFP determinations as a gatekeeping 
function to determine which parties should receive a subsidy to litigate. The next 
Section describes the beneﬁts that IFP status confers. 
B. The Beneﬁts of In Forma Pauperis Status 
The federal in forma pauperis statute allows a litigant to pursue a case in 
federal court without paying ﬁling fees and costs provided that the litigant sub-
mits an affidavit demonstrating an inability “to pay such fees or give security 
therefor.”
54
 It is worth enumerating brieﬂy which beneﬁts ﬂow from IFP status 
and which do not.
55
 As mentioned above, Congress sets the ﬁling fee—currently 
 
been focused on other aspects of litigation by those unable to pay ﬁling fees. Reading this 
history, the Sixth Circuit in Floyd applied “basic axioms of statutory interpretation, and . . . a 
little common sense” to hold that the word “prisoner” in § 1915(a)(1) was a scrivener’s error. 
Id. at 275-77. Other circuits have construed “assets such prisoner possesses” to read as “assets 
such persons possess.” See, e.g., Lister v. Dep’t of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(“Section 1915(a) applies to all persons applying for IFP status, and not just to prisoners.”). 
53. See, e.g., DeBlasio v. Gilmore, 315 F.3d 396, 399 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the PLRA fee 
requirements are not applicable to a released prisoner and that his obligation to pay ﬁling fees 
is determined by evaluating whether he qualiﬁes under the general in forma pauperis provi-
sion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)). 
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); see also Douglas, supra note 15, at 5 (identifying the “expenses which 
can discourage poor persons from turning to law courts to preserve their rights, or result in 
deprivation of the full beneﬁts which the law offers them”). 
55. This Article does not go so far as to recommend what in forma pauperis status should entail 
beyond the initial fee waiver. Instead, this project’s goal is to analyze how district courts re-
quire litigants to plead their poverty. In a subsequent project, however, I plan to address the 
question of what the federal courts should provide indigent litigants. The poverty determina-
tion of the in forma pauperis application is the threshold question for such an inquiry, and it 
would be ill-advised to recommend what beneﬁts should ﬂow from this indigence status with-
out ﬁrst examining who precisely is considered indigent. 
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at $350.
56
 The Judicial Conference can impose “additional fees,” and it has added 
a $50 “Administrative Fee for Filing a Civil Action, Suit or Proceeding in a Dis-
trict Court.”
57
 The district court’s waiver of these fees is the best-known beneﬁt 
of IFP status. 
There is some disagreement in the circuits as to which fees and costs are and 
are not waived for the IFP litigant.
58
 Some district courts will waive fees associ-
ated with electronic ﬁling and other records and transcripts,
59 but others do not 
consider daily transcripts to be part of the “fees and costs.”
60
 Discovery costs, 
such as those from deposing witnesses, are typically excluded as well. Despite 
Rule 54(b)’s “presumption that the losing party will pay costs,” the Rule none-
theless “grants the court discretion to direct otherwise.”
61
 One recognized situa-
tion where courts either reduce or deny costs is when “the losing party is indi-
gent.”
62
 However, the Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that a 
district court can assess costs against an unsuccessful IFP litigant.
63
 Relatedly, 
 
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). 
57. Id. § 1914(b). 
58. See, e.g., D. VT. R. 3(c) (waiving for in forma pauperis litigants “the cost of ﬁling and serving 
the complaint, but not litigation expenses unless provided by statute”). One could imagine 
an arrangement in which district courts should be permitted to calibrate who receives IFP 
status according to the beneﬁts that come with the status. In other words, if a district court 
assigned counsel to every IFP litigant who ﬁles her case without an attorney, perhaps that 
district court would (or even should) be more parsimonious with granting the status. 
59. See DeBlasio v. Gilmore, 315 F.3d 396, 398 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Zavala v. Deutsche Bank 
Trust Co. Ams., No. C 13-1040 LB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77664, at *112 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 
2013) (“If you cannot afford to pay the PACER access fees, you may ﬁle a motion with the 
court asking to be excused from paying those fees. A court may, for good cause, exempt per-
sons from the electronic public access fees, in order to avoid unreasonable burdens and to 
promote public access to such information.”). 
60. Barcelo v. Brown, 655 F.2d 458, 462 (1st Cir. 1981). But see W.D. KY. R. 5.3(b) (authorizing the 
court to “order production of additional documents as necessary” at no cost to the IFP liti-
gant). The Administrative Office’s transcript order form, the AO435, lists “in forma pauperis” 
under the purpose of the order. AO 435: Transcript Order, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. (2018), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/ao435.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AHD-FP4R]. 
See generally M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 124 (1996) (holding that states cannot condition 
appeals of the termination of parental rights on the affected parent’s ability to pay record-
preparation fees). 
61. Rivera v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2006). 
62. Mother & Father v. Cassidy, 338 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2003). 
63. Olson v. Coleman, 997 F.2d 726, 728 (10th Cir. 1993); Harris v. Forsyth, 742 F.2d 1277, 1277-
78 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 972-73 (4th Cir. 1981); see 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(f) (2018); Kenneth R. Levine, In Forma Pauperis Litigants: Witness Fees and Ex-
penses in Civil Actions, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1463 n.6 (1985). 
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some local rules allow the court to deduct fees and costs from recovery or at the 
close of litigation.
64
 
Beyond the waived ﬁling fee, IFP litigants receive other beneﬁts. First, in 
many district courts, when a federal judge grants an in forma pauperis motion, 
the court will direct the U.S. Marshal to serve process on the indigent litigant’s 
adversary.
65
 In 1983, the Judicial Conference added language to Rule 4(c) retain-
ing service of process by the Marshals Service for in forma pauperis plaintiffs. 
The purpose of the 1983 amendments was to relieve the U.S. Marshals of the 
burden of serving process in all cases.
66
 Furthermore, unlike the waived fees, the 
court may assess the costs of service if the plaintiff prevails in the litigation.
67
 
Of all the beneﬁts conferred by IFP status, appointment of counsel is argua-
bly the most consequential.
68
 Some district courts appoint counsel in civil actions 
for IFP litigants.
69
 It is difficult, though, to know how many courts engage in 
 
64. See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 621 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that courts may impose 
costs at the conclusion of an in forma pauperis plaintiff’s lawsuit, as in other cases). 
65. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. R. 3.3(g) (“Where an order is entered granting the IFP petition, that order 
shall, unless otherwise ordered by the court, stand as authority for the United States Marshal 
to serve summonses without prepayment of the required fees.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
4(c)(3) (similar provision). The 1892 statute read: “That the officers of court shall issue, serve 
all process, and perform all duties in such cases, and witnesses shall attend as in other cases, 
and the plaintiff shall have the same remedies as are provided by law in other cases.” Act of 
July 20, 1892, ch. 209, § 3, 27 Stat. 252, 252. 
66. See 128 CONG. REC. 30929-30 (1982) (letter from the Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. De-
partment of Justice, endorsing the amendments). 
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1920; see, e.g., Powell v. Carey Int’l, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2008). 
68. Relatedly, if the IFP litigant proceeds pro se, some courts provide access to court-administered 
mediation. See, e.g., Mediation Plan for Pro Se Civil Cases with Parties Granted In Forma Pauperis 
Status, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR W. DISTRICT TENN. 1 (Nov. 2018), https://www.tnwd
.uscourts.gov/pdf/content/ProSeIFPCivilCaseMediationPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/TRD3 
-9F67] (stating that mediation is available to “to all civil cases with Pro Se IFP parties”). There 
is some disagreement as to whether federal or state courts can compel counsel to serve an IFP 
litigant. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 15, at 5 (claiming that in a civil suit, a judge “has no 
power to require anyone to serve as counsel”); William B. Fisch, Coercive Appointments of 
Counsel in Civil Cases In Forma Pauperis: An Easy Case Makes Hard Law, 50 MO. L. REV. 527, 
535-42 (1985) (discussing the history of compelling counsel to represent poor litigants); Laura 
B. Hardwicke, After Mallard v. United States: The Federal Courts’ Inherent Power to Appoint 
Representation for Indigent Civil Litigants, 22 LOY. U. L.J. 715 (1991); Shapiro, supra note 30 
(arguing against the claim that lawyers should have an affirmative obligation to serve without 
compensation). 
69. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. R. 83.35 (describing the procedure for “the assignment of a member of the 
trial bar to represent a party who lacks the resources to retain counsel . . . in a civil action”); 
D.N.J. R. app. H (laying out procedures to “govern the appointment of attorneys to represent 
pro se parties in civil actions who lack sufficient resources to retain counsel pursuant to 28 
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this practice or how often they do so. There is no constitutional, statutory, or 
local rule requiring such an appointment. 
Finally, in forma pauperis status in the district court typically follows a plain-
tiff if she appeals. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that when 
a litigant is granted IFP status in the district court, a timely motion for leave to 
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal must generally be granted.
70
 If a district 
court dismisses a frivolous case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), that litigant must re-
apply to the appellate court to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, since the 
ﬁnding of frivolousness is viewed as certiﬁcation that appeal is not taken in good 
faith.
71
 Typically, IFP status also waives the fees collected by the clerk of the dis-
trict court when a litigant ﬁles a notice of appeal. 
In sum, by granting in forma pauperis status, the federal district court waives 
the initial ﬁling fee of $400 and sometimes confers other beneﬁts on the litigant. 
While not all the costs associated with litigation are waived for IFP litigants, the 
possible beneﬁts to the successful movant—the waived ﬁling fee, assistance ef-
fectuating service of process, waiver of other litigation costs, and even appointed 
counsel—are substantial.
72
 The fact that this status follows the litigant on appeal 
makes it an even more important determination at the trial-court level. The next 
Section analyzes how the ninety-four U.S. district courts structure a litigant’s 
poverty pleading. 
C. The Flaws of Federal In Forma Pauperis Practice 
As mentioned, the federal IFP statute and Rule 83 afford federal judges broad 
discretion in determining whether a litigant can proceed in forma pauperis. 
Based on the ﬁrst complete analysis of all the IFP forms and ﬁnancial affidavits 
used in the ninety-four U.S. district courts,
73
 this Article ﬁnds that current fed-
eral practice is inconsistent across districts and, because of the lack of standards 
 
U.S.C. § 1915”); see also Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 302-03 (1989) (identifying 
many American state statutes specifying that courts could assign or appoint counsel). 
70. FED. R. APP. P. 24(a); see Montana v. Comm’rs Court, 659 F.2d 19, 23 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 
1981). 
71. See, e.g., Oatess v. Sobolevitch, 914 F.2d 428, 430 n.4 (3d Cir. 1990). 
72. Forty percent of Americans report being unable to cover an emergency cost equal to the $400 
ﬁling fee. See Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2017, supra note 2, at 21. 
73. See infra Tables 1-4. To see how these materials were compiled and coded, please refer to the 
Appendix. The tables detail the results of the coding. Throughout this Section, citations are 
made to the results in the tables. Some districts are double counted in the summary statistics 
because some courts use one of the AO forms but also require a district-speciﬁc affidavit. 
the yale law journal 128:1478  2019 
1496 
for interpreting the various forms, within them as well. This Section lays out the 
survey of the district courts and identiﬁes the ﬂaws of the status quo. 
1. Summary Statistics of the In Forma Pauperis Forms 
Twenty-two district courts use the AO 239, the long-form application created 
by the Judicial Conference, either alone or in conjunction with a court-speciﬁc 
affidavit.
74
 Consisting of ﬁve pages, the AO 239 asks movants to list sources of 
income across twelve categories, expenses across ﬁfteen categories, employment 
history for the past two years, any cash on hand, assets, money owed to the liti-
gant or the litigant’s spouse, and dependents. A movant must also indicate 
whether she “expect[s] any major changes” to her income, expenses, assets, or 
liabilities in the next year; whether she has spent or will spend any money for 
expenses or attorneys’ fees in conjunction with the lawsuit; and her age and years 
of schooling. 
Thirty-seven district courts accept the shorter AO 240 form.
75
 At two pages, 
the AO 240 covers much of the same ground as the AO 239 form, but in less 
detail. Eighteen district courts accept it exclusively, while eight accept both the 
AO 239 and the AO 240 forms.
76
 The remaining forty-six district courts have 
created and use their own forms and/or affidavits.
77
 Of these courts, eleven have 
forms that resemble the AO 239
78
 and fourteen have created and use forms re-
sembling the AO 240.
79
 However, in each of these forty-six district courts, there 
is substantial variation both in terms of the types of questions asked and the level 
of detail required. Indeed, this survey is an illustrative example of the variation 
that follows from a federal system that permits local rulemaking.
80
 
 
74. See infra Table 1. 
75. See id. 
76. See id. 
77. See id. 
78. See infra Tables 2-4. 
79. See id. 
80. See 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3153, at 580 (3d 
ed. 2014) (quoting a former Director of the Federal Judicial Center who had referred to “ram-
pant inconsistency between local and national rules,” and noting that “[p]olicing local diver-
gences has proved difficult” (footnotes omitted)); Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The Role of 
Local Rules, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 62 (describing the Judicial Conference’s 1989 Local Rules 
on Civil Practice Project); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Sunset, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 555. 
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2. The Arbitrary Nature of Federal In Forma Pauperis Practice 
A poverty determination, often referred to as a means test in social policy, 
seeks to accurately target a beneﬁt to those who need it. Irrationality is a deﬁni-
tional vice in public beneﬁts—it undermines a program’s legitimacy by arbitrar-
ily excluding some who qualify for the program’s services. As the survey of the 
ninety-four district courts’ forms and affidavits shows, the wide variety of infor-
mation elicited by the courts and the lack of standards against which to interpret 
that information combine to create an irrational in forma pauperis regime. 
All the district courts that use their own forms inquire into the sources of the 
movant’s income. All federal IFP forms share some basic similarities, asking the 
movant about her current employment, if any, and her wage income. Some ask 
very few questions, like that of the Northern District of Indiana, which asks if 
the movant or the movant’s spouse is employed, if they have money from some 
other source, and for the value of their assets.
81
 The form subsequently inquires, 
“If you have no income listed above, explain how you (and spouse, if married) 
obtain food, clothing, shelter, and other necessities of basic living.”
82
 Other dis-
trict courts ask detailed questions about sources of income. Some ask about re-
tirement payments, including Social Security, pensions, and annuities. Eight 
district court forms ask detailed questions about public assistance,
83
 and several 
ask about cash on hand.
84
 The Western District of New York asks whether some-
one has ﬁled for bankruptcy in the past decade.
85
 The District of Nevada and the 
District of Rhode Island ask if ﬁnancial resources have been transferred to some-
one else recently.
86
 All district courts inquire as to the litigant’s assets, but dis-
crepancies emerge there too. The Southern District of Alabama asks about “au-
tomobiles, boats, [and] motor homes” as well as the “Make & Model” of each.
87
 
 
81. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR N. DISTRICT IND. 1 (Aug. 2016), 
http://www.innd.uscourts.gov/sites/innd/ﬁles/Approved%20IFP%20Motion-ﬁllable.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4JAS-ZZH7]. 
82. Id.; see also Motion to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR S. DISTRICT 
ALA. (Aug. 1, 2015), https://www.alsd.uscourts.gov/sites/alsd/ﬁles/forms/IFPMotion 
-localAO240.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5XL-7DFU] (“If you have indicated that you have min-
imal or no assets or income, please explain how you provide for your basic living needs such 
as food, clothing and shelter. (e.g. food stamps, family assistance or charitable contribu-
tions.)”). 
83. See infra Table 2. 
84. See infra Table 4. 
85. See infra Table 2. 
86. See infra Table 4. 
87. See id. 
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Indeed, some of these forms betray a rich person’s idea of assets, asking litigants 
about inheritances, jewelry, artwork, and stocks.
88
 
A few district courts identify threshold amounts, which permit movants to 
omit any source of income or asset under that threshold. The Northern District 
of Illinois asks if anyone living in the same home as the movant has an income 
of more than $200 a month.
89
 That court also asks the movant to list only those 
assets valued at more than $1,000. The Southern District of New York asks if 
the movant “or anyone else living at the same residence . . . received more than 
$200 in the past 12 months from any of the [listed] sources.”
90
 Such a practice 
frees the movant from having to count every penny in her possession. However, 
these threshold amounts are used by only a handful of district courts. 
While most district court forms follow the conventions for expenses of the 
AO 239 and AO 240 forms, others diverge. For example, the Northern District 
of Florida asks litigants to list monthly gas expenses for their cars. The District 
of Connecticut asks litigants about any money owed to doctors, hospitals, or 
lawyers.
91
 Five district courts do not ask about the applicant’s average expenses 
and bills.
92
 
Some variations across district courts reﬂect the particular circumstances in 
that given state. Understandably, the District of Alaska asks about the Alaska 
Permanent Fund Dividend, which functions as a negative income tax for the 
state’s residents.
93
 It is not surprising that no other district court would ask 
about Alaska dividend payments. It is surprising, though, that the district court 
 
88. See, e.g., U.S. Stock Ownership Down Among All but Older, Higher-Income, GALLUP (May 24, 
2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/211052/stock-ownership-down-among-older-higher 
-income.aspx [https://perma.cc/HL4Q-H7AE]. 
89. In Forma Pauperis Application and Financial Affidavit, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR N. DISTRICT ILL. 
2 (Aug. 23, 2018), http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/_assets/_documents/_forms/_online
/Form.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL8F-B3TF]. 
90. Application to Proceed Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR S. DISTRICT N.Y. 
1 (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/ﬁle/forms/application-to-proceed-without 
-prepaying-fees-or-costs-ifp-application [https://perma.cc/G9F4-9EUD]. 
91. Financial Affidavit in Support of Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR DISTRICT CONN. 5 (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.ctd
.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/forms/IFP-PROSE%20rev%206-17.pdf [https://perma.cc
/V9GH-FFTP]. 
92. See infra Tables 3, 4. 
93. Application to Waive the Filing Fee, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR DISTRICT ALASKA 3 (Dec. 2013), 
http://www.akd.uscourts.gov/sites/akd/ﬁles/forms/PS11.pdf [https://perma.cc/LW7G 
-CNB5]. 
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in Puerto Rico is the only district court that asks the movant whether she has any 
income from horse racing and gambling.
94
 
District courts also ask questions that fail to ﬁt neatly into the category of 
income or expenses. For instance, in addition to the courts that use the AO 239 
form, eighteen district courts ask a movant to disclose any contact and/or pay-
ments to an attorney or other legal professional. Three district courts ask the 
movant if she has paid or will be paying anyone other than an attorney (such as 
a paralegal or a typist) any money for services in connection with this case, in-
cluding the completion of this form.
95
 
In addition to the district courts that use the AO 239 form, ﬁfteen district 
courts ask about the movant’s years of schooling. A litigant’s schooling may bear 
on whether that litigant is capable of pursuing the litigation pro se, but it should 
not necessarily impact a court’s determination of her ﬁnancial situation. Other 
forms contain details that are oddly out of date,
96
 while the Eastern District of 
Oklahoma is the only district court that requires a notarized form.
97
 
What does this jumble reveal? A survey of federal in forma pauperis practice 
exposes discrepancies across and within districts, a lack of sophistication in as-
sessing the movant’s indigence, and a potential for inaccuracy. The range of the 
categories of questions asked by the various district courts as well as the discrep-
ancies within the categories suggest a cacophony of practices among the ninety-
four district courts.
98
 
These discrepancies are difficult to justify on the grounds of judicial admin-
istration or geographic diversity. For example, although geographic diversity 
might justify variation across states, it does not easily justify variation within 
states. Alabama, California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Penn-
 
94. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR DISTRICT P.R. 3 (1983), https://
www.prd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/17/AffidavitToAccompanyMotionTo 
ProceedInFormaPauperis.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN5H-LC5G]. 
95. See infra Table 4. 
96. Four district courts refer to Aid to Families with Dependent Children, the federal cash assis-
tance program that Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) replaced over twenty 
years ago. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. See generally Andrew Hammond, Welfare and Federalism’s Peril, 92 
WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1729-35 (2017) (discussing TANF’s replacement of Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children). 
97. Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis & Supporting Affidavit, U.S. DISTRICT CT. FOR E. 
DISTRICT OKLA. 3 (Sept. 2013), http://www.oked.uscourts.gov/sites/oked/ﬁles/forms 
/Motion%20to%20Proceed%20IFP_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/P48W-WAV3]. 
98. But see Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 STAN. L. REV. 941, 960 (2017) (explaining 
that in this common law system “our legal culture is deeply committed to consistency across 
cases”). 
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sylvania, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have mul-
tiple district courts, but some of the district courts in these thirteen states ask 
whether an individual receives public assistance while other district courts in 
these states do not. For what reason would some district courts not want infor-
mation about a litigant’s receipt of public assistance when others in the same 
state would want that information? 
The degree of difference across district courts undermines the federal system. 
Within states, district courts ask different questions about, for example, the 
sources of a litigant’s income and the variety of a litigant’s expenses. These ques-
tions have little to do with a litigant’s ability to pay. District courts also vary in 
how much information they demand from movants, asking questions with var-
ying degrees of speciﬁcity. 
3. An Inefficient Procedure for Judges 
In addition to allowing discrepancies across district courts, current federal 
practice permits signiﬁcant intradistrict variance in IFP determinations.
99
 All the 
forms currently in use in the federal courts—the AO 239 form, the AO 240 form, 
and the district-court-speciﬁc forms—leave judges with no benchmark for de-
ciding how much income is sufficiently low, how many expenses or debts are 
sufficiently high, and how many assets are sufficiently few. With no articulated 
threshold on any in forma pauperis form, judges must identify some means test 
(such as the federal poverty guidelines
100
) or create their own.
101
 Few federal 
courts provide any guidance for judges presented with an in forma pauperis mo-
tion.
102
 
This status quo is particularly troublesome in any district court made up of 
several judges. In a court like the Northern District of Illinois with thirty district  
 
 
99. I use the phrase “intradistrict variance” to describe the incidence of judges within the same 
district court making different determinations based on the same IFP form or forms. 
100. See, e.g., Assistant Sec’y for Planning & Evaluation, U.S. Federal Poverty Guidelines Used to De-
termine Financial Eligibility for Certain Federal Programs, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES 
(Jan. 11, 2019), https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines [https://perma.cc/4G53-PNV8]. 
101. One might expect judges to use the federal poverty guidelines issued by the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services. There might be other standards of need lurking in federal 
doctrine. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973) (deﬁning 
poor people as those who “because of their impecunity were completely unable to pay for 
some desired beneﬁt, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a mean-
ingful opportunity to enjoy that beneﬁt”). 
102. To my knowledge, the District of Nevada is the only district court that, in its local rules, pro-
vides such guidance. See D. NEV. R. 1-1 to -4. 
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judges and several magistrate judges, differences in a judge’s approach to in 
forma pauperis motions could lead to disparate outcomes in litigation. Even 
those who would defend different indigence determinations across district 
courts might balk at defending inconsistent determinations within a single 
court. Some judges might use 100% of the federal poverty level (FPL) as their 
threshold. Others will use 200%. Some will simply have their law clerks review 
the forms and decide based on the information provided.
103
 In that sense, even 
if each of the ninety-four district courts used either the AO 239 or the AO 240 
form, federal in forma pauperis practice would still be far from uniform. 
According to some district courts, “a plaintiff’s income must be at or near the 
poverty level.”
104
 Others have concluded that the applicant must show that he 
cannot “both provide himself with the necessities of life and pay the costs of lit-
igation.”
105
 The Supreme Court has held that an applicant need not be “abso-
lutely destitute” to qualify for IFP status.
106
 Some courts, though, have empha-
sized that this status is targeted at those who are “truly impoverished.”
107
 
Even if the Judicial Conference or local rules were to instruct federal judges 
to use a means test tied to the federal poverty level, it would not be clear how to 
use some information requested on the forms. For example, some federal judges 
may look at the receipt of public assistance as evidence of a movant’s indigence, 
 
103. See Todd C. Peppers et al., Inside Judicial Chambers: How Federal District Court Judges Select and 
Use Their Law Clerks, 71 ALB. L. REV. 623, 635 (2008) (noting that “97% of the [federal district 
judge] respondents stated that their law clerks review the relevant briefs and draft memoranda 
and orders regarding dispositive motions”); Albert Yoon, Law Clerks and the Institutional De-
sign of the Federal Judiciary, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 131, 142 (2014) (citing studies showing that “law 
clerks are playing an increasingly larger role in the opinion-writing process”). 
104. Bulls v. Marsh, No. 89 C 3518, 1989 WL 51170, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 1989); see also Zaun v. 
Dobbin, 628 F.2d 990, 992 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that a federal court is not prohibited 
“from requiring particularized information with regard to the ﬁnancial status of a party seek-
ing leave to proceed under § 1915”). 
105. United States v. Valdes, 300 F. Supp. 2d 82, 84 (D.D.C. 2004) (denying an IFP petition due 
to the movant’s resources and income), rev’d on other grounds, 475 F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
106. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948); see Rowland v. Cal. Men’s 
Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 203 (1993) (explaining that the Court considers an in forma pauperis 
“affidavit . . . sufficient [when it] states that one cannot because of his poverty pay or give 
security for the costs . . . and still be able to provide himself and dependents ‘with the neces-
sities of life’” (second alternation in original) (quoting Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339)); see also Lewis 
v. Ctr. Mkt., Civ. Nos. 09-306 et al., 2009 WL 5217343, at *3 (D.N.M. Oct. 29, 2009) (“[T]he 
federal standards for IFP are not a bright-line percentage rule, but rather, rely on the discre-
tion of the court.”). 
107. See, e.g., Brewster v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972) (“This privilege 
to proceed without posting security for costs and fees is reserved to the many truly impover-
ished litigants who, within the District Court’s sound discretion, would remain without legal 
remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them.”). 
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while other federal judges might look at the same movant’s income from public 
assistance as freeing that movant up to pay the ﬁling fee.
108
 
Thus, even if all district courts were to decide tomorrow to adopt one form, 
such as the AO 240, federal in forma pauperis practice would remain irrational 
because it would still fail to provide federal judges with any standards by which 
to interpret the forms. With no guidelines for judges to follow, the federal sys-
tem merely asks several questions without showing judges how to use the an-
swers to those questions in making the in forma pauperis determination. 
Aside from its arbitrary variation, federal IFP practice is also an inappropriate 
use of a federal judge’s time.
109
 Computing a movant’s income and expenses is 
arithmetic and does not demand the attention of a federal judge. Currently, fed-
eral judges must make complicated, arcane poverty determinations—often rec-
onciling a dozen categories of income with a dozen categories of expenses. Such 
determinations are not, by their nature, adjudicatory. Federal judges could take 
back some of their time by streamlining a fairly ministerial function. 
Furthermore, this inefficiency makes it plausible to think that many federal 
judges and their clerks do not engage in a careful evaluation of the information 
provided on the IFP form. Such inattention would render the collection of the 
information in the ﬁrst place all the more pointless. In fact, this insight may ex-
plain why some district courts direct in forma pauperis applications to a partic-
ular judge or even to staff in the clerk’s office.
110
 Two of the district courts with 
 
108. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1961, 1990 n.122 (2007) (explaining how “in the absence of strong feedback” a judge can “lock 
into a routine set of practices even when those practices are suboptimal or ﬂawed”). 
109. The role of the judge in pro se proceedings is much discussed in the courts and the scholarly 
literature. Discussion of pro se litigants by courts can range from the solicitous to the conde-
scending. See, e.g., United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182, 186 (9th Cir. 1973) (describing 
pro se litigants as “rang[ing] from the misguided or naive . . . through the pressured one un-
der the hardships of the accusation of crime and the sophisticated person enamored with his 
own ability, to the crafty courtroom experienced one who ruthlessly plays for the break,” but 
noting that “[a]ll eventually play the part of the proverbial fool”). Perhaps IFP motions chan-
nel these litigants into a system in which the district court provides more assistance than they 
might otherwise ﬁnd. The pro se system, then, may signiﬁcantly overlap with IFP practice. 
To be sure, a pro se appearance sometimes signals indigence for litigants who want to bring a 
case but need the assistance of an attorney. However, it is beyond the scope of this Article to 
explore the connection between pro se and IFP practice in a comprehensive fashion. 
110. See, e.g., Grostic, supra note 15 (recounting how a case brought by an in forma pauperis litigant 
was transferred to a particular judge per local administrative rule). For a classic criticism of 
these practices, see Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1456 
(1983), which argues that “[t]he proliferation of staff and subjudges and the delegation of 
power to them weaken the judge’s individual sense of responsibility.” 
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the highest number of civil ﬁlings manage in forma pauperis pleadings differ-
ently. The Southern District of New York runs IFP applications through the 
Clerk’s Office, whereas the Northern District of Illinois treats IFP applications 
like other pleadings, channeling them through an individual judge’s cham-
bers.
111
 This sorting of litigants based on ability to pay might raise other, even 
constitutional, questions.
112
 Even a district court that relies more heavily on ju-
diciary staff for IFP determinations would save time and improve accuracy with 
the test proposed later in this Article. 
Judges either take IFP determinations seriously or they do not. If the former 
is true, the system is arguably inefficient. If the latter, then there is little reason 
to collect all this information and there are signiﬁcant accuracy gains to be had. 
Especially in the face of persistent criticisms of the increasing demands on fed-
eral trial judges’ time and resources,
113
 federal judges should use a more stream-
lined, sophisticated test to determine whether an IFP movant is sufficiently poor. 
Such a test would free judges to focus on other aspects of civil litigation. 
4. An Invasive Procedure for Litigants 
Current federal practice needlessly burdens not only judges but litigants as 
well. All the federal in forma pauperis forms are invasive. Asking movants to 
itemize every source of income, every expense, every asset, and their years of 
schooling is demeaning. Even if an in forma pauperis form is precisely targeted, 
poor litigants are being asked too much to plead their poverty. 
Consider a working parent who believes she was ﬁred from her job because 
of her gender. She seeks to bring a Title VII claim against her employer. Because 
 
111. Based on background interviews with former clerks in both courts. 
112. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Twombly in Context: Why Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b) Is 
Unconstitutional, 64 FLA. L. REV. 895, 910 (2012) (stating that “it is unfair and humiliating to 
subject poor people to pre-service review of their lawsuits but exempt those wealthy enough 
to pay a ﬁling fee”); Feldman, supra note 15, at 414 (asking whether “an in forma pauperis 
complaint [can] be dismissed even though an identical paid complaint cannot be similarly 
dismissed” but concluding that the difference in treatment is constitutional because wealth is 
not a suspect classiﬁcation). These questions are ultimately beyond the scope of this Article. 
113. See, e.g., Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 
781 (1981) (“Few would dispute that the caseload in the federal courts has reached crisis pro-
portions.”); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding 
a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 770 & n.1 (1981) (explaining that federal 
district court ﬁlings more than doubled between 1968 and 1980); Judith Resnik, Managerial 
Judges and Court Delay: The Unproven Assumptions, 23 JUDGE’S J. 8, 54 (1984) (arguing that 
“[j]udges’ time is one of the most expensive resources in the courthouse”); Caseload Increases 
Stress Need for New Federal Judgeships, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www 
.uscourts.gov/news/2013/09/10/caseload-increases-stress-need-new-federal-judgeships 
[https://perma.cc/R3JA-C66F]. 
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her income is below the federal poverty level, she is able to secure representation 
through a local legal aid office. She also begins to receive food assistance to sup-
plement her lost wages. After ﬁling a complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, she could ﬁle her claim in Arizona state court, where 
she would automatically receive IFP status. However, if she ﬁled that same Title 
VII case in the U.S. District Court of Arizona, she would ﬁrst need to ﬁll out the 
AO 239 form. To do so, she would have to swear under penalty of perjury to her 
sources (and amounts) of income across twelve categories, expenses across ﬁf-
teen categories, employment history for the past two years, any cash on hand, 
any assets, and debts owed to her. She would have to divulge how many years of 
schooling she has had. After engaging in such an invasive process, this litigant 
may receive IFP status or she might not. A federal judge could interpret her re-
ceipt of food assistance and her employment history as evidence of her ability to 
afford the ﬁling fee and the concomitant costs of the litigation. A different judge 
in the same court could look at that same evidence as reasons to grant IFP status. 
To accurately determine a litigant’s poverty, a court need not require a liti-
gant to answer ﬁve pages’ worth of questions and itemize sources of income, 
expenses, assets, and debts across forty-two categories for herself and members 
of her household. Nor is such a cumbersome pleading process necessary to deter 
fraud. Courts already possess tools to encourage truthful statements from liti-
gants. As described in Part I, any litigant who applies to proceed in forma pau-
peris signs an affidavit “under penalty of perjury that the information below is 
true” with the acknowledgement that “a false statement may result in a dismissal 
of [that litigant’s] claims.”
114
 
Since these applications require a signiﬁcant amount of information, the ap-
plications function as a tax on litigation by poor people. However, not all poten-
tial IFP litigants will be in a similar position to pay the tax. There will be some 
who ﬁnd it easier to comply with the paperwork—whether through education, 
assistance from family or friends, or simply having more time. Others who lack 
those resources or face other obstacles (such as a language barrier) may not.
115
 
Finally, by making access to federal court cumbersome for poor litigants, the 
current IFP regime risks shielding the federal courts from cases and claims more 
 
114. AO 239: Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form), 
JUD. CONF. U.S. 1 (2015), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/ao239_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MK7F-2ZP9]. 
115. See, e.g., Anandi Mani et al., Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function, 341 SCIENCE 976, 976-77 
(2013). In the literature on tax compliance, many have argued that complexity is costly for 
both taxpayers and tax collectors, leading to arbitrary decisions and inequitable treatment of 
taxpayers. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simpliﬁcation, 1990 WIS. L. 
REV. 1267, 1291-94. 
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likely to be brought by poor people.
116
 If federal courts are making it too bur-
densome for poor people to bring meritorious claims, one might expect that the 
federal courts are less likely to receive claims brought by poor people involving, 
for example, employment discrimination, police misconduct, and disputes over 
government services.
117 
As a result, there are costs and harms beyond those to 
the particular litigants who may be deterred from accessing the federal courts. If 
the litigants in federal court are unrepresentative of the people who would oth-
erwise bring federal claims, federal jurisprudence could itself become dis-
torted.
118
 
5. A Faulty Status Quo for the Federal Courts 
This overview of current practice suggests an accretion of nonsensical prac-
tices permitted by broad statutory language and enabled by the absence of rule-
making at the national level and the proliferation of local rules and forms at the 
court level. This status quo most likely persists because of the judiciary’s failure 
to view the system from the perspective of the litigants who must navigate it. 
Some may defend current practice as a positive good—that federal courts 
should ask dozens of questions of a litigant to understand how underresourced 
that litigant truly is. Litigants should pay, they will argue, either with their 
money or their time. In fact, this notion of imposing costs on poor people to 
 
116. See Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 502-03 (2012) 
(arguing that restrictive procedural rules marginalize plaintiffs with fewer economic re-
sources); Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1836 (2014) (detailing how “[l]itigation 
forces dialogue upon the unwilling and temporarily alters conﬁgurations of authority”). 
117. See Myriam Gilles, Class Warfare: The Disappearance of Low-Income Litigants from the Civil 
Docket, 65 EMORY L.J. 1531, 1538-39 (2016) (discussing concerns that as “low-income claims 
disappear from the docket” judges could “lose important opportunities to engage with these 
categories of issues and litigants”). Others have argued that these litigants have themselves 
been sources of change in federal practices. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazell, 
The Ordinary and Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465, 510-16 (1980) 
(discussing how the revolution of structural reform litigation was not brought about by re-
medial innovations of federal judges, but by new groups of litigants advancing novel claims). 
118. See In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (per curiam) (underscoring that “[p]aupers 
have been an important—and valued—part of the Court’s docket” (citing Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963))); see also Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447, 
500 (2009) (“When the resources and abilities of opposing parties are lopsided, the adversar-
ial system will fail to produce accurate results.”). See generally ALEXANDRA D. LAHAV, IN PRAISE 
OF LITIGATION 29-30 (2017) (characterizing litigation as a democracy-promoting institution 
that helps to enforce the law, fosters transparency, offers a form of social equality by giving 
litigants equal opportunity to be heard, and promotes participation in self-government). 
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access government services such as the courts has a long tradition in the United 
States and elsewhere.
119
 By keeping pleadings complicated, we encourage only 
those litigants who are conﬁdent in their claims and committed to press those 
claims in court. 
However, the Supreme Court has explained that the purpose of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915 is “to guarantee that no citizen shall be denied an opportunity to com-
mence, prosecute, or defend an action, civil or criminal, in any court of the 
United States, solely because . . . poverty makes it impossible.”
120
 The IFP pro-
cess is not meant to serve as an additional, merits-ﬁltering process that is not 
imposed on other litigants. Its purpose is simply to remove the barrier of poverty 
for litigants who would otherwise bring a federal lawsuit. If one wanted such an 
additional process, then that merits screening should be based on the actual mer-
its of the claims, rather than on an irrational process that makes litigants jump 
through procedural hoops to test their conﬁdence in their claims. 
Regardless of whether one thinks poor litigants should or should not be sub-
jected to probing questions about their life circumstances, the substantial vari-
ance created by the current system remains. Given that the federal courts ask for 
a wide variety of information from litigants, the courts cannot all be making de-
terminations of the ultimate issue (the ability to bring suit with one’s own re-
sources) accurately. Some are demanding too much, and some may be demand-
ing too little. Both types of errors risk undermining the functions of federal 
district courts. 
If IFP determinations permit false negatives (i.e., poor people being denied 
IFP status), then the current system deprives indigent litigants of meaningful 
access to the federal courts. Despite federal law’s longstanding commitment not 
to let a litigant’s indigence interfere with the merits of that litigant’s claims, the 
IFP statute, as administered by the federal courts, is at substantial risk of doing 
precisely that. If there are false positives (i.e., nonpoor people being granted IFP 
status), then prevailing practice not only deprives the federal system and some-
times the local bar of scarce resources but also fails to target this beneﬁt to those 
who most need it. These false positives mean the federal judiciary is depriving 
itself of resources—and not only by failing to collect fees. IFP status triggers 
other resources in the federal system. For instance, using the U.S. Marshals to 
effectuate service of process takes the Marshals away from other crucial func-
 
119. State TANF programs, for instance, often require applicants to jump through various bureau-
cratic hoops to receive assistance. 
120. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting Adkins v. E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948)). 
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tions. In those districts where appointment of counsel sometimes follows con-
ferral of IFP status, federal judges are mobilizing the bar to aid poor litigants. 
Judges should do so only when a person could not otherwise afford an attorney. 
Furthermore, if the success of an in forma pauperis motion inﬂuences, let 
alone determines, the outcome of the litigation, then all proceduralists should be 
committed to making the federal courts more accurate in their IFP screening. 
Fortunately, federal law provides myriad analogous means tests with which to 
compare IFP determinations. Comparing these determinations to the more 
standardized, albeit imperfect, means tests in other federal programs can help us 
envision a more coherent IFP test. 
i i .  other sources of poverty pleading 
The federal judiciary currently measures the poverty of its litigants in rudi-
mentary ways. As outlined in Part I, federal practice exhibits several ﬂaws. How-
ever, these ﬂaws are not inevitable or even characteristic of poverty determina-
tions. Federal and state agencies and state court systems routinely make poverty 
determinations. The federal judiciary should look to and learn from other means 
tests in federal law, including those administered by federal and state agencies. 
Federal judges should also draw on the in forma pauperis rules of state court 
systems. 
A. Means Tests in Federal Law 
When the government, or any organization, devises a means test, it seeks to 
accurately target the beneﬁt to those who need it. Federal law contains multiple 
means tests to determine whether an individual is poor enough to merit receiv-
ing public beneﬁts, such as Medicaid, food assistance, and welfare. Many of these 
means tests use the federal poverty guidelines published by the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS). The HHS poverty guidelines for 2019 
for the forty-eight contiguous states and the District of Columbia calculate the 
federal poverty level on the basis of household size; a household of one is cur-
rently set at $12,490, while a household of three is set at $21,330.
121
 
Many researchers and government officials have conceded that the federal 
poverty guidelines need revision.
122
 Originally created using back-of-the-enve-
lope calculations based on the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Thrifty Food 
 
121. Assistant Sec’y for Planning & Evaluation, supra note 100. 
122. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Blank, Why the United States Needs an Improved Measure of Poverty, BROOK-
INGS (July 17, 2008), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/why-the-united-states 
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Plan, the poverty guidelines apply to the lower forty-eight states and the District 
of Columbia. The guidelines fail to consider government beneﬁts like food as-
sistance or low-income tax credits.
123
 Most of the means tests in federal law use 
income thresholds tagged to HHS’s federal poverty level (FPL). It is telling, 
though, that none of the major federal public-beneﬁts programs use the federal 
poverty level as the means test, but rather a multiple of that level such as 125% 
or 185% FPL.
124
 For instance, the Legal Services Corporation (LSC), the federal 
agency that funds legal aid across the country, limits its grantees to serve only 
those whose household annual income does not exceed 125% FPL.
125
 As men-
tioned above, when Congress enacted a fee-waiver provision for Chapter 7 ﬁlers 
in federal bankruptcy court, they established a threshold of 150% FPL.
126
 
 
-needs-an-improved-measure-of-poverty [https://perma.cc/G4YA-AUPE] (“It is not too 
strong a statement to say that, 45 years after they were developed, the official poverty thresh-
olds are numbers without any valid conceptual basis.”); Rourke L. O’Brien & David S. Pe-
dulla, Beyond the Poverty Line, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (2010), https://ssir.org/articles
/entry/beyond_the_poverty_line [https://perma.cc/8ZFW-7R6Z] (“Most people who care 
about measuring poverty—academics, policymakers, nonproﬁt leaders, and the like—agree 
that the way the federal government currently determines who is poor and who is not doesn’t 
work.”); Chad Stone et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, CTR. 
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty 
-and-inequality/a-guide-to-statistics-on-historical-trends-in-income-inequality [https://
perma.cc/V8LZ-XSMT]. 
123. In 2009, the federal government created an interagency working group to develop a Supple-
mental Poverty Measure (SPM) that would address some of the shortcomings of the official 
federal poverty guidelines. That federal effort led the U.S. Census Bureau, in cooperation with 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, to create the SPM. See, e.g., Trudi Renwick & Liana Fox, The 
Supplemental Poverty Measure: 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 2016), https://www.census
.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-258.pdf [https://perma.cc
/NL6W-UXVP]. However, the SPM does not replace the official poverty measure and is not 
used to determine eligibility for government programs. One day, the federal government may 
replace the poverty guidelines with the SPM, but, currently, there are no plans to implement 
the SPM. As a result, this Article uses the HHS poverty guidelines as the most useful means 
test in federal law. 
124. Many of these federal programs use different terminology to refer to the same features of the 
means test. See DAVID A. SUPER, PUBLIC WELFARE LAW 189 (2016) (“Jargon varies signiﬁcantly 
from program to program: what AFDC [TANF’s predecessor] called disregards, [the Supple-
mental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)] calls exclusions or deductions. What AFDC 
called a family unit or grant group is called a household in SNAP and a ﬁling unit in Medi-
caid.”). SNAP, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Social Security all have a different 
deﬁnition of the word “elderly.” Id. 
125. 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(c)(1) (2018). 
126. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
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For the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly 
known as food stamps, most households must meet both the gross and net in-
come tests, set at 130% and 100% FPL, respectively.
127
 Gross income refers to 
income before any deductions are made. Net income allows for several deduc-
tions.
128
 The Affordable Care Act established a new methodology for determin-
ing income eligibility for Medicaid, known as Modiﬁed Adjusted Gross Income, 
but that legislation’s Medicaid expansion was tagged to 133% FPL.
129
 
Federal public assistance also makes use of “adjunctive eligibility,” a bureau-
cratic practice where qualifying for one public beneﬁt serves as a presumption 
for qualifying for another. For instance, SNAP households have to meet income 
tests unless all members are receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) or the disability beneﬁt Supplemental Security Income (SSI). TANF 
recipients often automatically qualify for Medicaid. Such a shortcut takes ad-
vantage of the administrative data of federal and state bureaucracies to save the 
applicant and the agency time and resources. 
In touting the merits of means tests for federal public beneﬁts as a model for 
federal IFP determinations, this Article risks effacing some of the persistent 
problems with administering antipoverty programs. To be sure, irrationalities 
and inefficiencies persist in the administration of federal public beneﬁts. Occa-
sionally, localities and state governments erect barriers to access, and sometimes 
 
127. See, e.g., Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Beneﬁts Categorical Eligibility Desk-
Aid, N.Y. OFF. TEMPORARY & DISABILITY ASSISTANCE (May 2016), https://otda.ny.gov/policy
/directives/2016/ADM/16-ADM-06-Attachment-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/94SJ-7BSR]. A 
household with an elderly person or a person who is receiving certain types of disability pay-
ments only has to meet the net income test. It is not uncommon for other public-assistance 
programs to have slightly less stringent means tests for the elderly or people with disabilities. 
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C) (2018) (giving states the option to establish a program 
for individuals with signiﬁcant health needs whose income is too high otherwise to qualify 
for Medicaid under other eligibility groups). 
128. These deductions include: (1) a twenty percent deduction from earned income; (2) a standard 
deduction of $157 for household sizes of one to three persons and $168 for a household size 
of four (and higher for some larger households); (3) a dependent care deduction when needed 
for work, training, or education; (4) medical expenses for elderly or disabled members that 
are more than $35 for the month if they are not paid by insurance or someone else; (5) legally 
owed child support payments; and (6) in some states a set amount for shelter costs for home-
less households. 
129. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001, 124 Stat. 119, 271 
(2010) (amending the Medicaid statute to create a new eligibility standard); see also Getting 
MAGI Right, GEO. CTR. FOR CHILD. & FAMILIES (Jan. 2015), http://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp 
-content/uploads/2015/01/Getting-MAGI-Right_Jan-30-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/8X8R 
-8BKA]. 
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those policies are struck down by courts.
130
 Still, those practices should not ob-
scure two basic features that the federal judiciary could borrow: a means test tied 
to the federal poverty level and adjunctive eligibility. 
As argued in detail in Part III, the federal judiciary should learn from these 
federal public-assistance programs in administering its own means test for indi-
gent litigants. The federal judiciary should use the poverty guidelines published 
by the federal government, and it should do so in a manner that is consistent 
with other poverty determinations in federal law. SNAP, Medicaid, and the LSC 
all target their services to those truly in need. Oddly enough, the federal govern-
ment funds civil legal services based on the federal poverty guidelines, but it does 
not require that litigants receiving those services enjoy the beneﬁts of in forma 
pauperis status when their federally funded attorney ﬁles their case in federal 
court. An adjunctive eligibility rule would ﬁx that discrepancy and others. 
B. In Forma Pauperis Practice in State Courts 
Moving past federal law, one can also compare the federal in forma pauperis 
statute to the indigence rules that govern state courts in the United States. In 
this instance, both federal and state courts are performing identical functions: 
assessing a party’s ﬁnancial situation to determine whether that party merits a 
fee waiver and other beneﬁts. A review of those state statutes and court rules 
offers a way forward for a more coherent and efficient federal practice.
131
 
Proceduralists and state courts themselves often look to the federal system 
for procedural innovations.
132
 Here, however, looking in the other direction 
 
130. See Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming 
the district court’s injunction of a Florida statute requiring drug testing as a condition of wel-
fare eligibility); Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (enjoining a 
Michigan law authorizing the drug testing of welfare recipients), aff’d by an equally divided 
court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
131. In this way, improving in forma pauperis practice avoids the inside/outside fallacy that some-
times afflicts public law scholarship: scholars will criticize the institutional actors in a legal 
system and then identify a proposal that those same, allegedly deﬁcient actors should imple-
ment. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1743, 1745 (2013). Here, federal judges can borrow practices from their counterparts in the 
state judiciaries. 
132. See, e.g., Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of 
Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 319 (2001) (ﬁnding that roughly half of states have adopted the Federal 
Rules as their own civil procedure system); cf. Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in 
State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative 
Rule-Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1172-75 (2005) (noting that “although the federal 
rules once exerted a powerful inﬂuence on state procedure, during the last two decades state 
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proves illuminating. There are good reasons to turn to state court systems for 
procedures that deal with low-income litigants. First, poor litigants are more 
likely to be found in state than in federal court.
133
 Second, several states’ in forma 
pauperis rules predate the federal system’s commitment.
134
 Third, the ﬁfty state 
court systems, as well as the District of Columbia’s system, offer a range of mod-
els from which the federal system can borrow best practices. 
Like 28 U.S.C. § 1915, many states’ in forma pauperis statutes have amor-
phous indigence standards.
135
 Some states give IFP status to a litigant who is 
 
deference to the federal rules has waned” and advocating for an interstate collaborative system 
to replace the failure of the top-down Federal Rules model). But see Abbe R. Gluck, The States 
as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modiﬁed Textu-
alism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1753-59 (2010) (arguing that scholars have paid insufficient attention 
to state courts as innovative sites of statutory interpretation); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, 
The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 117 (2002) (criticizing “the legal acad-
emy’s . . . ignorance of the wondrous variation in state and local systems”). 
133. See Hannah Lieberman, Uncivil Procedure: How State Court Proceedings Perpetuate Inequality, 
35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 260 (2016) (“Defendants in these millions of [state] civil cases 
tend to be persons of low or modest income.”); Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access 
to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts, 22 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473, 475 (2015) (discuss-
ing the need for a social justice approach to “state civil courts serving large numbers of low-
income, unrepresented litigants”); Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor Peo-
ple’s Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 743 (2015) (detailing how “pro se litigation—primarily in-
volving the indigent—now dominates the landscape of state courts”). The rise of poor liti-
gants in state courts offers a functional explanation for why states have experimented with 
“civil Gideon.” See Laura K. Abel & Max Rettig, State Statutes Providing for a Right to Counsel in 
Civil Cases, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 245, 245 (2006) (documenting state statutes or court 
rules that “provide[] for a right to counsel and the extent to which state right-to-counsel stat-
utes attempt to ensure that counsel is competent”); Clare Pastore, A Civil Right to Counsel: 
Closer to Reality?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065, 1074, 1081 (2009) (noting that “a small number 
of judges” have been calling for it and that the term connotes an “implicit adoption of the 
public defender model as an aspirational goal”). But see Benjamin H. Barton, Against Civil 
Gideon (and for Pro Se Court Reform), 62 FLA. L. REV. 1227, 1227-29, 1231-34 (2010) (expressing 
skepticism toward civil Gideon efforts); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for 
Reform, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1227, 1231 (2014) (same). 
134. See, e.g., An Act Providing a Mean to Help and Speed Poor Persons in Their Suits, 1834 Ky. 
Acts 327; An Act to Assist Poor Persons in the Prosecution of Their Suits, 1800 N.J. Laws 339; 
An Act Providing a Mean to Help and Speed Poor Persons in Their Suits, ch. 65, 1823 Va. Acts 
356; see also THOMAS K. URDAHL, THE FEE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES (Madison, Wis., 
Democrat Printing Co. 1898) (describing the history of fee systems among government offic-
ers including judges); Lee Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor 
Persons in Civil Cases, 2 VAL. U. L. REV. 21, 30 (1967) (collecting states’ in forma pauperis 
rules). Edwina Clarke and Judith Resnik pointed me to these sources. 
135. See IOWA CODE § 610.1 (2018) (“Such affidavit shall also include a brief ﬁnancial statement 
showing the person’s inability to pay costs, fees, or give security.”); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. 
art. 5182 (West 2018) (requiring that IFP status be “restricted to litigants who are clearly en-
titled to it”). 
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unable to pay the fee and still provide for herself and her family.
136
 Other states’ 
statutes and court rules contain itemized categories of income and expenses in 
the statute.
137
 However, several states administer more reﬁned means tests for 
their in forma pauperis procedures. Twenty-six states use a means test tied to 
the federal poverty guidelines.
138
 Most states that identify an income threshold 
set it at 125% of the federal poverty line
139
 or higher.
140
 
Several state court systems allow for adjunctive eligibility. Litigants who re-
ceive other means-tested public beneﬁts are automatically eligible to proceed in 
forma pauperis. Most state court systems that permit a litigant to prove her in-
digence through beneﬁt receipt include TANF, SSI, Medicaid, and SNAP among 
the qualifying beneﬁts.
141
 Some include less frequently available beneﬁts such as 
 
136. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68632(c) (West 2009) (allowing state courts to waive fees for “[a]n 
applicant who, as individually determined by the court, cannot pay court fees without using 
moneys that normally would pay for the common necessaries of life for the applicant and the 
applicant’s family”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.190 (LexisNexis 2017) (deﬁning a “poor per-
son” as someone who “is unable to pay the costs and fees of the proceeding in which he is 
involved without depriving himself or his dependents of the necessities of life, including food, 
shelter, or clothing”). 
137. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8802(b) (2018) (instructing litigants to “provide complete 
information as to the affiant’s identity, the nature, source and amount of all of the affiant’s 
income, the affiant’s spouse’s income, all real and personal property owned either individually 
or jointly, all cash or bank accounts held either individually or jointly, any dependents of the 
affiant and all debts and monthly expenses”). 
138. See infra Table 5. Guam and West Virginia are the two jurisdictions that set a means test not 
tied to the federal poverty guidelines. 
139. Id.; see, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68632(b) (allowing state courts to waive fees for “[a]n appli-
cant whose monthly income is 125 percent or less of the current poverty guidelines updated 
periodically in the Federal Register by the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services”). 
140. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.082(2)(a) (West 2006) (200%); MONT. CODE ANN. § 47-1-111(3)(a) 
(2017) (133%); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-202(3)(a)(ii) (West 2017) (150%); ARIZ. CODE JUD. 
ADMIN. § 5-206 (2015) (150%); N.J. CT. R. 1:13-2 & 2:7 (150%); N.M. CT. R. 10-408 (150%); 
TEX. R. CIV. P. 145 (200%); Application to Waive Filing Fees and Service Costs, VT. JUDICIARY 2 
(Nov. 2014), https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/sites/default/ﬁles/documents/Form-228
.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4NF-YGVX] (150%). 
141. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68632(a) (waiving fees for litigants who are receiving any of 
seven public beneﬁts including SSI, SNAP, TANF, and Medicaid); see infra Table 5; cf. MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 261, § 27A (West 2004) (omitting SNAP); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 400.10a(d) (2017) (including TANF and SSI in the deﬁnition of “public assistance,” but not 
SNAP or childcare assistance). 
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General Assistance,
142
 while others single out means-tested veterans’ beneﬁts.
143
 
In fact, in some of these states, the Affordable Care Act’s expansion of Medicaid, 
made optional by the Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness v. Sebelius,
144
 has had the additional effect of making more litigants auto-
matically eligible for in forma pauperis status.
145
 
Some states sensibly align their in forma pauperis procedures with legal aid. 
Eighteen states allow litigants represented by legal aid attorneys automatically 
to qualify for IFP status.
146
 For instance, Minnesota allows for any litigant rep-
resented by a civil legal services attorney or a volunteer pro bono attorney to 
proceed in forma pauperis.
147
 South Carolina allows for a similar mechanism for 
a litigant to plead her poverty, but it requires that litigant’s attorney to certify to 
the court that representation is provided through that legal aid organization or 
pro bono program and that the party is unable to pay the ﬁling fees.
148
 
Some states allow their judges to permit a partial ﬁling fee for those who 
wish to proceed in forma pauperis.
149
 This option avoids the beneﬁt-cliff prob-
lem, whereby those who fall just above the threshold receive no beneﬁts, in much 
the same way that other public-beneﬁts programs like SNAP have beneﬁt 
amounts that taper off with an increase in income.
150
 Federal practice allows 
judges to assign partial ﬁling fees, but this practice appears to be more common 
in prisoner suits than in other cases.
151
 
 
142. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-105(a)(2)(i) (West 2003) (allowing the receipt of Aid 
to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD) or General Assistance to meet the indigence stand-
ard). 
143. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 261, § 27A(a) (identifying poverty-related veterans’ beneﬁts); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 814.29(1)(d) (West 2007); NEB. R. 3-13; N.M. CT. R. 10-408 (waiving 
fees in juvenile cases); WASH. CT. GEN. R. 34. 
144. 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (rendering the Medicaid expansion optional because the federal govern-
ment could not threaten states with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding if they declined 
to comply). 
145. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 261, § 27A. But see TEX. R. CIV. P. 145 (not specifying 
which “government entitlement programs” create adjunctive eligibility). 
146. See infra Table 5. 
147. MINN. STAT. § 563.01 (2016). 
148. S.C. R. CIV. P. 3(b)(2). 
149. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 68631, 68632(c), 68636(d), 68637(e) (West 2009). 
150. Elizabeth Wolkomir & Lexin Cai, The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Includes Earn-
ings Incentives, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (2018), https://www.cbpp.org/sites 
/default/ﬁles/atoms/ﬁles/7-25-17fa.pdf [https://perma.cc/P84Z-GE8G]. 
151. See, e.g., E.D. TENN. R. 4.2 (“Depending on the amount of funds available to the petitioner, 
the Court may require the petitioner to pay a portion of the ﬁling fee.”). 
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Putting these different features together, several states’ in forma pauperis 
rules offer an appealing model for the federal system. They offer the litigant four 
ways to plead poverty: (1) a bright-line means test pegged to the federal poverty 
guidelines; (2) adjunctive eligibility through public-beneﬁt programs; (3) eligi-
bility through legal aid representation; and (4) a catchall determination that 
would preserve some of the discretion of current federal practice.
152
 These four 
pathways would reduce the administrative burden for federal judges and liti-
gants as well as standardize and rationalize outcomes by targeting in forma pau-
peris status to beneﬁt the truly needy. 
i i i .  toward a coherent in forma pauperis standard 
In a nation where half of households have an annual income of less than 
$62,000,
153
 who should pay for the federal courts is an open question. One could 
imagine a pay-per-use system, a system that is ﬁnanced entirely by general tax 
revenues, or, what is most likely, a combination of both. Rather than entering 
the debate about how best to ﬁnance a court system, this Article fastens itself to 
the institutional limits of the federal courts.
154
 By binding itself to the federal 
 
152. This fourth possibility is often phrased as “substantial hardship.” See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/5-105(a)(2)(iii) (West 2003). 
153. Jonathan L. Rothbaum, Redesigned Questions May Contribute to Increase, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2018/09/highest-median 
-household-income-on-record.html [https://perma.cc/9L94-KJRX] (“Income data released 
by the U.S. Census Bureau today show that 2017 median household income was the highest 
on record at $61,372.”). 
154. Others have thoughtfully explored what such a commitment to equal justice for poor people 
means absent a given institutional framework. See, e.g., Richard M. Re, “Equal Right to the 
Poor,” 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1149, 1216 (2017) (exploring the meaning of the federal judicial oath 
of office as “an authoritative directive that federal courts attend to economic equality”); Judith 
Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and 
Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2127-30 (2000) (discussing 
paying for legal representation in the context of mass torts); see also Omri Ben-Shahar, The 
Paradox of Access Justice, and Its Application to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1755, 
1759 (2016) (“It is so commonly assumed that access justice beneﬁts the weak that the premise 
has escaped any signiﬁcant scrutiny.”). Others have considered how best to pay for civil adju-
dication. See, e.g., Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 739 (2010) 
(proposing a one-way progressive fee-shifting rule); see also Deborah R. Hensler, Financing 
Civil Litigation: The US Perspective, in NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION IN EU-
ROPE: A LEGAL, EMPIRICAL, AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 149 (Mark Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 
2010) (describing how civil litigation is ﬁnanced in the United States and considering whether 
the current structure leads to excessive litigation). Indeed, some may argue that no one should 
have to pay to access the federal courts. Instead of embracing such a solution, this Article 
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system’s commitment laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Article uses that statutory 
commitment of access for indigent litigants as the baseline from which to analyze 
current federal practice. Taking seriously Congress’s promise to provide access 
to poor litigants, this Part proposes a coherent in forma pauperis standard. 
A. Designing a National In Forma Pauperis Standard for the Federal Courts 
Federal courts should allow litigants to proceed in forma pauperis if they 
meet one of four conditions. First, any litigant whose net income is at 150% of 
the federal poverty level and who has assets of less than $10,000 should be con-
sidered indigent by a federal court. That income calculation should include at 
least partial deductions for necessary expenses like medical expenses, childcare, 
housing, and transportation. Such an income threshold would be consistent 
with the federal indigence standard for bankruptcy proceedings as well as with 
means tests for SNAP, Medicaid, legal aid providers, and many state court sys-
tems. 
In calculating eligibility for in forma pauperis status, the federal courts 
should also consider assets. LSC-funded organizations must set reasonable asset 
ceilings for eligible households.
155
 A court should still look at a litigant’s assets 
even if that litigant’s income is below the federal poverty level. If a movant is low 
income but has signiﬁcant assets that could be used to pay the ﬁling fee without 
hardship, those assets should be considered. The rule could allow the court to 
look into whether a litigant has recently tried to reduce their assets to avoid using 
them for their litigation.
156
 In practice, it seems unlikely that the federal courts 
would see such a litigant, but to ensure accurate targeting, the federal rule should 
include an asset limit. That asset limit should exclude the movant’s residence 
and vehicle, and should be limited to $10,000 in liquid assets. 
The second way a litigant could proceed in forma pauperis is adjunctive eli-
gibility through federal public-assistance programs. Today, public assistance is 
included as a source of income on most IFP forms.
157
 As a result, a federal judge 
 
promotes an accurate, streamlined process that serves the commitments of Congress and the 
federal judiciary better than the status quo. 
155. See 2019 Basic Field Grant Terms and Conditions, LEGAL SERVICES CORP., https://www.lsc.gov
/grants-grantee-resources/grantee-guidance/grant-assurances/2019-basic-ﬁeld-grant-terms
-and-conditions [https://perma.cc/ZLC9-D8A6]. 
156. See D.N.H. R. 4.2(b) (“An applicant shall be entitled to proceed in forma pauperis if the ap-
plicant’s ﬁnancial affidavit . . . demonstrates that the applicant is unable to pay or prepay the 
fees and pay the costs of the action and the court determines that the applicant has not delib-
erately depleted his or her assets in order to become eligible for in forma pauperis status.”). 
157. See supra Section I.C. 
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can just as easily use a litigant’s receipt of federal food stamps to discredit her 
pleading of poverty instead of as evidence of the litigant’s indigence. Instead of 
counting beneﬁt receipt as a source of income, federal judges should follow the 
lead of various states and use it as a bureaucratic shortcut to prove the movant’s 
poverty. As mentioned above, the federal judiciary could take advantage of the 
accurate screening conducted by agencies administering federal public assistance 
with little fear of fraud. 
Third, along the lines of Minnesota, South Carolina, and other states, the 
federal courts could adopt a rule that litigants represented by a legal aid organi-
zation, including those funded by the federal LSC, can proceed in forma pau-
peris.
158
 Such a rule would eliminate the contradictory practice where a litigant 
might be needy enough to merit a federally funded legal services lawyer, but not 
needy enough for a federal court to waive fees and costs. As with adjunctive eli-
gibility for public beneﬁts, such a rule would shift the burden of determining 
need from the judges to legal aid organizations who must make that determina-
tion in the ﬁrst instance. Moreover, this rule would encourage underresourced 
litigants to seek assistance or simply advice from these organizations, potentially 
cutting down on the litigants who proceed pro se. 
Finally, this new proposed standard would preserve the discretionary au-
thority of the federal courts. By providing a catchall category, a federal judge 
would still be able to permit a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis even if she 
could not prove her indigence through the three mechanisms outlined above. 
This discretionary category would allow judges to grant in forma pauperis status 
to an individual who, for instance, is disqualiﬁed on the basis of income, but has 
signiﬁcant expenses not included in the new means test. 
There will be opposition to these proposed changes. One critique is that this 
national standard would neglect differences in costs of living. Some may believe 
that the status quo allows, albeit haphazardly, for regional, state, and intrastate 
variations—a worthy design feature for a country that spans a continent. In a 
related vein, discretion, some say, is a feature, not a bug, of the Federal Rules.
159
 
 
158. But see Gillian K. Hadﬁeld, Higher Demand, Lower Supply—A Comparative Assessment of the 
Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 140 (detailing that 
6,581 LSC-funded attorneys represent one-half of one percent of all lawyers in the United 
States). To be sure, there will be some overlap among these three categories of automatic 
qualiﬁcation. An individual who is being represented by an LSC-funded attorney may receive 
(or at least may be eligible to receive) Medicaid. However, due to the sheer number of Amer-
icans who live below the federal poverty level, it is unlikely that this overlap will reduce the 
number of people who are eligible for IFP status. 
159. Compare Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008), with Gil Seinfeld, 
The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the Justiﬁcations for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 
97 CALIF. L. REV. 95 (2009). Many have located this generalized discretion in the Federal Rules 
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However, federal law is chock-full of means tests that apply nationwide and even 
more that apply to the lower forty-eight states.
160
 That said, to address stark 
regional differences, the new standard could permit district courts via local rule 
to increase the income means test to, say, 200% of the federal poverty level. In 
other words, the new standard could allow courts to choose their own means 
test tied to the federal poverty level so long as it exceeded 150%. Such an income 
threshold may be more appropriate for areas where the cost of living is far higher 
than the national average. Making such an upward adjustment permissible 
among districts sacriﬁces some of the uniformity across districts but would use 
the suggested ﬂoor as a signal of reasonableness. Nevertheless, this option would 
also invite a district court to make a considered decision while still cutting down 
on the intradistrict variance by requiring that judges in the same district use the 
same means test. 
Others might argue that a uniform IFP standard deprives judges of the ben-
eﬁts of incremental, Burkean learning.
161
 To be sure, a national standard could 
 
themselves. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 108, at 1967 (“Case-speciﬁc discretion has been at the 
heart of the Federal Rules ever since they were ﬁrst adopted in 1938.”); Edward H. Cooper, 
Simpliﬁed Rules of Federal Procedure?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1794, 1795 (2002) (emphasizing that 
“vast discretion remains at virtually every turn” in the Federal Rules); Richard L. Marcus, 
Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1565-66 (2003) (distinguishing 
primary and secondary discretion); Mark Moller, Procedure’s Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 650 
(2011) (describing how the Federal Rules “embrac[e] vague, discretion-conferring tests”); 
Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 123, 128-29 (2015) (“Rules delib-
erately use abstract, discretionary—almost poetic—language in order to allow district courts 
to achieve the ﬂexible goal of procedural due process.”). But see Christopher M. Fairman, 
Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 557 (describing the “global vision of the drafters” of 
the Federal Rules to be that “litigants should have their day in court”). 
160. The federal poverty guidelines are calculated for the lower forty-eight states, Alaska, and Ha-
waii, respectively. 
161. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
892 (1996) (noting that traditions “reﬂect a kind of rough empiricism: . . . they have been 
tested over time, in a variety of circumstances, and have been found to be at least good 
enough”); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 359 (2006) (“The 
argument for Burkeanism is that respect for traditions is likely to produce better results, all 
things considered, than reliance on theories of one or another kind, especially when those 
theories are deployed by such fallible human beings as judges.”). But cf. Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897) (“History must be a part of 
the study, because without it we cannot know the precise scope of rules which it is our busi-
ness to know. It is a part of the rational study, because it is the ﬁrst step toward an enlightened 
scepticism, that is, toward a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those rules . . . . It is 
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of 
Henry IV.”); David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699, 
1706 (1991) (“Some precedents may be said to be part of a tradition. But not all are. Some are 
simply the decisions of a group of judges rendered a few years ago.”). 
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squelch some of this knowledge building. However, some features of the survey 
summarized in Part I suggest that in forma pauperis practice is characterized not 
by considered reﬂection but by clerical drift: the failure to update forms that list 
defunct public-beneﬁt programs, confusion in various clerks’ offices as to which 
form is currently accepted, and the lack of a record of deliberation on IFP plead-
ings in district courts or the Judicial Conference. Moreover, a discretionary sys-
tem does not necessarily mean the decision maker must be deprived of standards, 
as is the case with the status quo. Federal law often provides rules of decision to 
assist federal judges, including in instances that are committed to the judge’s 
discretion.
162
 This proposed national standard still preserves a judge’s discretion 
by permitting the judge to grant IFP status even if the litigant is not eligible on 
the basis of income, adjunctive eligibility, or legal aid representation. This na-
tional standard does not, however, permit judges to deprive poor litigants of IFP 
status if they satisfy one of those three conditions. In a sense, the national stand-
ard guards against the particularly parsimonious judge by relying less on district- 
or judge-speciﬁc learning. 
Some might worry that adjunctive eligibility will lead to false negatives and 
false positives. Of course, there are individuals who are poor enough to receive 
SNAP but do not want to receive assistance or may have recently been kicked off 
the program. One would not want a system that penalizes poor litigants who fail 
to enroll in antipoverty programs. However, that would only be true if adjunctive 
eligibility was the only way to proceed in forma pauperis. As for false positives, 
such inaccurate determinations are less of a concern for the public-assistance 
programs used in the proposed test. SNAP is currently experiencing record-low 
 
162. The Sentencing Guidelines serve as a prominent example. See United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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levels of fraud.
163
 Fraud rates among beneﬁciaries in the Medicaid and TANF 
programs are also low.
164
 
Others might be concerned that linking IFP eligibility to other programs ties 
in forma pauperis determinations to the often-embattled American safety net 
and the vicissitudes of congressional funding. If Congress were to eliminate the 
LSC or to block grant Medicaid or SNAP, participation in those programs could 
plummet.
165
 A criticism in the same vein, but from a different angle, might posit 
that the United States is ﬁtfully moving toward universalism in the provision of 
old-age insurance, education, and healthcare. Some argue that means tests are 
 
163. Only about one percent of SNAP beneﬁts are trafficked, compared with four percent before 
the system became electronic. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-956T, SUPPLE-
MENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: PAYMENT ERRORS AND TRAFFICKING HAVE DE-
CLINED, BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 11 (2010). When the Food and Nutrition Service began is-
suing SNAP through electronic beneﬁt transfer (EBT) cards, the Anti-Fraud Locating Using 
EBT Retailer Transactions (ALERT) system was created to monitor electronic transaction ac-
tivity and identify suspicious stores for analysis and investigation. See SNAP: Examining Ef-
forts to Combat Fraud and Improve Program Integrity, Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t 
Operations & the Subcomm. on the Interior of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th 
Cong. 14 (2016) (statement of Kevin W. Concannon, Under Secretary, Food, Nutrition and 
Consumer Services). In ﬁscal year 2015, over 1,900 stores were permanently disqualiﬁed for 
trafficking and another 800 stores were sanctioned for other violations. Id. at 83 (statement 
of Stacy Dean, Vice President for Food Assistance Policy, Center on Budget and Policy Prior-
ities). Trafficking has fallen dramatically over the past 15 years. See id. 
164. See Peter Budetti, How CMS Is Fighting Fraud: Major Program Integrity Initiatives, CENTERS 
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (June 11, 2012), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and 
-Education/Look-Up-Topics/Fraud-and-Abuse/Fraud-page.html [https://perma.cc/EE47 
-S7F2]. The Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 led to the creation of a national 
audit, the Medicaid Payment Error Rate Measurement, which estimates the percentage of 
payments that either should not have been made or were made for the wrong amount. See 
Payment Error Rate Measurement Manual, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Jan. 
2018), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs
/Medicaid-and-CHIP-Compliance/PERM/Downloads/FY17PERMManual.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WG8H-FLRQ]; cf. Medicaid Integrity Program, Annual Summary Report of Com-
prehensive Program Integrity Reviews, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (June 
2012), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare-Medicaid-Coordination/Fraud-Prevention/FraudA-
buseforProfs/Downloads/2012pisummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6XR-AE53] (providing a 
summary of best practices for preserving the integrity of state Medicaid programs). There is 
concern that the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is rife with improper payments, see, e.g., 
Robert Greenstein et al., Reducing Overpayments in the Earned Income Tax Credit, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax 
/reducing-overpayments-in-the-earned-income-tax-credit [https://perma.cc/5T3H-P85C], 
but no state has used EITC receipt as a way to prove one’s indigence. The federal judiciary 
should similarly ignore the EITC. 
165. See Hammond, supra note 96, at 1765-69 (discussing recent congressional proposals to re-
structure Medicaid and SNAP). 
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stigmatizing and should be abandoned altogether.
166
 Yet, participation in these 
programs is more secure than the ﬁrst criticism suggests and far more wide-
spread than the other criticism allows. As for the concern about tying in forma 
pauperis determinations to other federal programs, attempts to block grant 
Medicaid and SNAP have repeatedly failed since 1996, including in the last Con-
gress.
167
 As for the second, a substantial portion of the United States receives 
Medicaid or SNAP. Medicaid pays for close to half the births in the United 
States.
168
 One in seven Americans receive SNAP beneﬁts.
169
 
The sheer unpredictability of the current regime means that if this Article’s 
proposal were adopted, some people who may have obtained IFP status under 
the status quo would not.
170
 But, if this proposal is sound, those are people who 
should not have received IFP status in the ﬁrst place (the false positives discussed 
earlier). In the bargain, truly poor people will not be blocked by the whims of a 
particular judge. This Article proposes a streamlined system that sharply reduces 
the number of people who are unjustly asked to pay the costs and fees of litiga-
tion rather than a system that permits some litigants to avoid costs and fees that 
they could afford to pay. Moreover, all these criticisms fail to see this proposal in 
light of current practice. The sensible approach is not to maintain the status quo 
but to take all possible steps to rationalize federal practice, making it more effi-
cient for judges and less demeaning for litigants. In light of the capricious fea-
tures of federal practice, it would be ill-advised to eschew effective improvements 
simply because the improvements themselves are not ﬂawless.
171
 
Finally, Congress, the Judicial Conference, and district courts could adopt 
any of these proposed pathways without necessarily adopting the others. Each 
 
166. See, e.g., NEIL GILBERT, TRANSFORMATION OF THE WELFARE STATE: THE SILENT SURRENDER 
OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 142 (2002) (“‘The means test stigmatizes beneﬁciaries’ is a mantra 
that has gained almost factual status from repetition.”); Andrew G. Biggs, Means Testing and 
Its Limits, NAT’L AFF., Fall 2011, at 97. 
167. See Hammond, supra note 96, at 1765-69. 
168. See, e.g., Phil Galewitz, Nearly Half of U.S. Births Are Covered by Medicaid, Study Finds, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 3, 2013), https://khn.org/news/nearly-half-of-u-s-births-are-covered 
-by-medicaid-study-ﬁnds/ [https://perma.cc/5DL4-75PM]. 
169. See, e.g., Alan Bjerga, Food Stamps Still Feed One in Seven Americans Despite Recovery, BLOOM-
BERG NEWS (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-03/food 
-stamps-still-feed-one-in-seven-americans-despite-recovery [https://perma.cc/L4DU 
-BDNJ]. 
170. See Douglas, supra note 15, at 8 (“Much of the value of the in forma pauperis practice would be 
lost if too stringent standards of poverty were required to qualify as a pauper.”). 
171. In fact, one could easily reverse engineer this proposal for the federal system and apply it to 
any state court system. State legislatures or state courts could adopt this model in forma pau-
peris practice through statute or judicial rule, respectively. 
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of the changes proposed above would ease the administrative burden for the fed-
eral courts and reduce the likelihood of discrepancies across and within district 
courts. Taken together, this Article’s proposed national standard offers a no-
wrong-door solution: litigants may receive IFP status through either a simple 
calculation of net income and assets based on federal law, adjunctive eligibility 
based on other federal programs, representation by a legal aid attorney, or the 
judge’s discretion. 
B. Adopting a National In Forma Pauperis Standard for the Federal Courts 
Although we can now envision a more coherent IFP standard, the question 
is how to implement it. These institutional avenues are driven by the federal ju-
diciary’s rulemaking framework established by Congress through the Rules En-
abling Act.
172
 Most proceduralists would welcome a reasoned Supreme Court 
decision that fashions a workable, national standard for in forma pauperis deter-
minations by construing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Yet it is unlikely we will see such a 
decision. The Supreme Court has insisted that those who seek to improve the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pursue changes not through judicial interpre-
tation, but through the rulemaking process.
173
 As a result, there are three plau-
sible ways to replace the status quo of in forma pauperis determinations: (1) 
 
172. The Rules Enabling Act delegates to the Supreme Court the power “to prescribe general rules 
of practice and procedure” for cases in federal court, subject to congressional acquiescence. 28 
U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2018); see, e.g., Gene R. Nichol Jr., Judicial Abdication and Equal Access to the 
Civil Justice, 60 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 325, 330 (2010) (contending that judges play “a singular 
and deﬁning role in creating, maintaining, and assuring open, effective, and meaningful ac-
cess to the system of justice they administer”); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, Brak-
ing the Rules: Why State Courts Should Not Replicate Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501, 517 (2016) (“Since the mid-1970s, the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure have been amended and federal procedure altered by three different casts 
of characters: the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the majority of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, and the judges on the federal district courts.”). 
173. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (“A requirement of greater speci-
ﬁcity for particular claims is a result that ‘must be obtained by the process of amending the 
Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.’” (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Nar-
cotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993))); Crawford-El v. Brit-
ton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (“To the extent that the court was concerned with this procedural 
issue, our cases demonstrate that questions regarding pleading, discovery, and summary judg-
ment are most frequently and most effectively resolved either by the rulemaking process or 
the legislative process.”); see also Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial 
Rulemaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 447, 449 (2013) (describing the Court’s tendency to “engage[] 
in amendment by case law instead of through the [rulemaking] process”); A. Benjamin Spen-
cer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 453-54 (2008) (criticizing the Court for circum-
venting the formal rule-amendment process through Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
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Congress could amend 28 U.S.C. § 1915; (2) the Judicial Conference could 
amend (and the Supreme Court could approve) the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and/or propose a new form; or (3) district court practice could converge 
as district courts adopt the new standard. This Section considers each option in 
turn. 
1. Congress 
Congress could amend 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to contain the following in forma 
pauperis standard
174
: 
A litigant may proceed in forma pauperis if: 
a) That person’s income after taxes and basic necessities, includ-
ing, but not limited to medical expenses, childcare, housing, and trans-
portation, is 150% of the federal poverty level or less, and that person’s 
assets are less than $10,000, excluding their home and their vehicle; 
b) That person receives public assistance (including, but not lim-
ited to the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Medicaid, Sup-
plemental Security Income, or Temporary Assistance to Needy Families); 
c) That person is represented by a pro bono attorney, including one 
practicing as part of a legal aid organization funded by the Legal Services 
Corporation; or 
d) That person, in the sound discretion of the court, cannot pay the 
fees and costs without causing substantial hardship to the litigant or the 
litigant’s family. 
There are good reasons to start with Congress. First, federal in forma pau-
peris practice is ultimately a creature of congressional design. Second, the test at 
issue (how poor is poor enough) is fundamentally legislative.
175
 Third, Congress 
 
544 (2007)). But see Porter, supra note 159, at 142 (noting a lack of scholarly consensus on “the 
Court’s role in the rulemaking process, or on the related question of the relationship between 
the Court’s rulemaking role (however that might be deﬁned) and its Article III powers of 
adjudication”). 
174. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 400 (2015) (“Con-
gress . . . has ultimate authority over the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). But see David 
Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 
UTAH L. REV. 927, 961 (“Although they have formal roles, the Judicial Conference, Supreme 
Court, and Congress act largely as rubber stamps in the rulemaking process.”). 
175. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text (discussing the PLRA’s mangling of in forma 
pauperis determinations for nonprisoners); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discre-
tion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 718 
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sets means tests for other federal programs: the income thresholds for Medicaid, 
SNAP, and other programs are laid out in statute. This statutory ﬁx would allow 
for adjunctive eligibility in a manner consistent with other means tests in federal 
law and many state court systems. It would also set a bright-line means test that 
would eliminate inter- and intradistrict discrepancies, directing federal judges to 
consult the best available standard: the poverty guidelines determined by the 
federal government. While streamlining eligibility standards, it would still allow 
judges to grant in forma pauperis status in the absence of public-beneﬁts partic-
ipation or an arithmetic income calculation by preserving the “substantial hard-
ship” standard that persists in judicial opinions.
176
 
2. The Judicial Conference 
Although Congress could amend the statute to create a more coherent in 
forma pauperis standard, such a statutory ﬁx may not be forthcoming.
177
 In-
stead, the Judicial Conference could propose, through the Rules Enabling Act, 
an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that would set out the 
four pathways included in the statutory language above.
178
 Such an amendment 
would give federal judges the much-needed rules of decision for granting in 
forma pauperis status. 
Although less desirable than a new rule, the federal courts could also create 
a more coherent system simply by producing a new form. Without amending 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, through the Administrative Office, could replace either or both of the AO 
 
n.186 (1988) (“The proposal is decidedly not that Congress assume primary responsibility for 
prospective procedural law.”). 
176. See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure 
from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 80 (1989) (“The federal rule 
drafters . . . relied to a large extent on trial judge discretion to shape optimal lawsuit structure 
for each dispute.”); Gardner, supra note 98, at 1002 n.327 (noting that “rules are often rounded 
at the edges as decisionmakers chafe at their under- or overinclusiveness”); Tobias Barrington 
Wolff, Discretion in Class Certiﬁcation, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1897, 1941-43 (2014) (advocating for 
a discretionary “safety valve” for class action rules). 
177. Congress is increasingly unproductive. See Vital Statistics on Congress, BROOKINGS tbl.6-4 
(Apr. 18, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Vital-Statistics 
-Chapter-6-Legislative-Productivity-in-Congress-and-Workload_UPDATE.pdf [https://
perma.cc/HKV7-HVBP] (showing the number of bills enacted by Congress decreasing every 
session since the 108th Session (2003-2004)). 
178. See Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 
332-33 (2006) (explaining that the Court uses supervisory power to “announce procedural 
rules not otherwise required by Congress or the Constitution”). 
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239 and AO 240 forms with a streamlined in forma pauperis application.
179
 Such 
a form would solicit the information relevant to the determination set forth in 
the statutory language outlined above.
180
 A model form is included at the end of 
this Article.
181
 Like the status quo, a new form would fail to give judges the rules 
of decision they need to interpret the movant’s information. But by eliminating 
extraneous inquiries, such as questions about jewelry and the make and model 
of a movant’s car, such a form may discourage a decision maker’s caprice. Alter-
natively, the Judicial Conference could solicit interest from individual district 
courts in adopting this simpliﬁed practice as a pilot district, as they have done 
with two recent projects.
182
 
A new in forma pauperis form might appear quite quotidian, especially com-
pared to the statutory ﬁx proposed above. However, there is a rich tradition of 
providing forms for federal litigants—one that dates back to the creation of the 
 
179. See Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codiﬁed as amended at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (2018)) (vesting in the Judicial Conference the power to initiate amend-
ments to the rules, and thus to forms like AO 239and AO 240); James C. Duff, Overview for 
the Bench, Bar, and Public: The Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking 
-process-works/overview-bench-bar-and-public [https://perma.cc/AG6Y-78NX]; see also 
Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered 
Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2601-10 (1998) (discussing the interplay between Congress and 
the federal judiciary); Subrin & Main, supra note 172, at 502 (describing the “lengthy process” 
of “federal procedural amendments” which “includes review by the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (the ‘Standing Committee’), 
the Judicial Conference of the United States, the United States Supreme Court, and ﬁnally, 
the United States Congress”). 
180. See supra Section III.B.1; see also D.C. CT. R. § 15-712, https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default
/ﬁles/NEW%20IFP%20application%20ﬁll-in-blanks.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5FR-M989] 
(using a checklist format to determine eligibility). 
181. See infra Appendix B. This form is a ﬁrst attempt to streamline the IFP process in such a way 
that would be consistent with gathering enough information to make an accurate determina-
tion without making the process unduly burdensome for litigants and judges. In order to im-
plement the form effectively, the district courts would most likely also need to provide some 
additional guidance, perhaps in a frequently asked questions document. 
182. Expedited Procedures Pilot Project: Overview, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/content
/320247/expedited-procedures-pilot-project-overview [https://perma.cc/9QZU-VPCZ]; 
Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project Overview, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov 
/content/321837/mandatory-initial-discovery-pilot-project-overview [https://perma.cc
/W2VT-FXD2]; see also William D. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1882 (2002) (pointing out that “liberal discovery can also work against 
poorer litigants [who] can be ﬂooded with discovery requests”); Jeffrey S. Sutton & Derek A. 
Webb, Bold and Persistent Reform: The 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and the 2017 Pilot Projects, JUDICATURE, Autumn 2017, at 12 (discussing both pilot projects). 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
183
 Recent amendments to Rule 84 suggest that 
the Judicial Conference is backing away from its use of sample forms for pro se 
litigants.
184
 Scholars have criticized the Judicial Conference’s decision to do away 
with the appendix of sample complaints and other forms.
185
 However, many of 
the forms provided by the Judicial Conference in civil, criminal, and bankruptcy 
proceedings remain available to litigants. There is no evidence that the Judicial 
Conference is planning to do away with either the AO 239 or the AO 240 form. 
As a result, it would be fairly simple for the Judicial Conference to propose im-
provements to these forms along the lines suggested by this Article, or to replace 
them with the model form provided. 
3. U.S. District Courts 
If Congress and the Judicial Conference fail to act, individual district courts 
could promulgate their own local rule laying out the four pathways outlined 
above: a means test, adjunctive eligibility through public beneﬁts, representation 
by a legal aid attorney, and a discretionary test. Individual district courts could 
also adopt a simpliﬁed form like the one included in this Article—just as they 
have decided to adopt the AO 239, the AO 240, or their own form. Every district 
court may adopt one of the forms provided by the Judicial Conference or create 
their own. That freedom at the court level could be used to stitch together a more 
coherent federal system. Admittedly, such a method would allow interdistrict 
differences to persist in federal practice: any district court that failed to adopt 
 
183. See Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 181 (1958) (“We re-
quire a general statement [in Rule 8]. How much? Well, the answer is made in what I think 
is probably the most important part of the rules so far as this particular topic is concerned, 
namely, the Forms.”); Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil Procedure After the 
2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 9 (2016) (“The Federal Rules illustrated this simpler ap-
proach with several hypothetical complaints that were included in the rules’ appendix.”). 
184. See Sarah Staszak, Procedural Change in the First Ten Years of the Roberts Court, 38 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 691, 715 (2016) (arguing that by “eliminat[ing] a variety of sample forms available to 
guide parties during the course of litigation,” the Rule 84 amendments did away with tools 
that “were especially useful for pro se cases and small-ﬁrm litigants, who may otherwise lack 
the access to alternate resources”). For discussion of the rulemaking process in the Roberts 
Court, see Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005 (2016); and 
Porter, supra note 159, at 124-27. 
185. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, The Forms Had a Function: Rule 84 and the Appendix of Forms as 
Guardians of the Liberal Ethos in Civil Procedure, 15 NEV. L.J. 1113 (2015); Steinman, supra note 
183, at 9, 51-52. 
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this form would continue to plod along the path of the status quo.
186
 But the 
streamlined standard described in this Section would sharply reduce intradistrict 
variance in any district court that adopts this standard.
187 
As more district courts 
adopted this standard, the federal system would slowly but surely rationalize its 
in forma pauperis practice. 
iv.  bottom-up procedure 
This Article’s most basic aim is to document the inconsistencies and ﬂaws in 
federal in forma pauperis determinations and how they could be changed in such 
a way that promotes the interests of the courts and litigants alike. Along the way, 
though, the Article illustrates a different approach to the study of procedure. 
A. A Different Perspective 
In forma pauperis determinations are only a single feature of federal practice, 
but they are also the lived reality for thousands of litigants who seek redress in 
federal court. This Article’s emphasis, then, is not on the federal appellate courts, 
but on the trial courts that hear most litigants’ claims. It dwells not on the rulings 
and reasoning of the highest court, but on the everyday procedures that deﬁne 
civil adjudication in the federal courts. In other words, this is procedural schol-
arship that begins not from the top down, but from the bottom up. The Article 
models this mode of analysis, call it “bottom-up procedure,” with a ﬁrst attempt 
to chart the range of federal in forma pauperis practice. 
This perspective on civil procedure demands that we not lose sight of how 
people with few resources access systems of adjudication. These individuals ex-
pose cracks in adjudicatory systems.
188
 Resources tend to smooth bumps in the 
procedural road and enable parties to take alternative paths to resolve disputes. 
 
186. See Burbank, supra note 175, at 715 (describing the “trend of modern procedural law” as a move 
“away from rules that make policy choices” and “towards those that confer on trial courts a 
substantial amount of normative discretion”). 
187. See id. at 718 (“Effective procedural reform will not come from a small group of ‘experts,’ nor 
will it come from the Supreme Court alone.”). 
188. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 258 (2004) (“Given that the 
quality of representation depends on the ability to pay, current civil procedure doctrine would 
seem to provide a systemic distribution of the risk of error in favor of those who have the 
greatest share of social resources.”). For an example of how “[a] focus on outsiders reveals 
how law intersects with their forced marginalization,” see Guadalupe T. Luna, “Facts Are Stub-
born Things:” Irregular Housing in the Texas Colonias, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 121, 128 n.41 
(2013). 
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Those who lack resources are often unable to seek out a different forum, and so 
they are most likely to reveal the deﬁciencies in the system. By following poor 
litigants through systems of civil justice, we can readily engage with norms and 
practices that pervade trial courts but sometimes fail to rise to the courts of re-
view. 
This perspective of bottom-up procedure is not conﬁned to a single method-
ology. To make these norms and practices legible, scholars will need to collect 
data on these practices through coding court materials as this Article does; per-
forming quantitative analyses of various stages of litigation;
189
 and interviewing 
clerks, judges, lawyers, and, perhaps most importantly, the litigants them-
selves.
190
 Importantly, this approach should not displace existing procedural 
scholarship or its attendant emphasis on aggregate litigation, the rise of alterna-
tive dispute resolution, and transnational applications of personal jurisdic-
tion.
191
 A bottom-up perspective may yield insights on these topics as well. Ra-
ther, the bottom-up perspective is an attempt to resist the instinct in the academy 
and the judiciary to equate federal courts with the big case and parties with deep 
pockets.
192
 Federal courts are also fora for poor people. 
Those who study civil justice can borrow from the ﬁelds of criminal and ad-
ministrative procedure for examples of this bottom-up perspective on procedure. 
Scholars of criminal procedure often embrace this approach.
193
 As Issa Kohler-
 
189. For an example of quantitative analysis of federal district court practice, see Miguel de 
Figueiredo et al., Against Judicial Accountability: Evidence from the Six Month List (un-
published manuscript) (Feb. 20, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2989777. 
190. For an example of how qualitative research can build legal theory, see Monica C. Bell, Police 
Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054 (2017). 
191. See Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the 
Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1709-10 (2017) (comparing “the 
rise of non-traditional omnibus legislation” as “a symptom of the bigger problems of legisla-
tive gridlock and overwhelming regulatory complexity” with “the rise of” multidistrict litiga-
tion as “a sign of deeper pressures on the traditional model of procedure”). 
192. See Thomas O. Main, Procedural Constants: How Delay Aversion Shapes Reform, 15 NEV. L.J. 
1597, 1613 (2015) (arguing that “[a]lthough big cases constitute a small percentage of federal 
court litigation, the problems with big cases tend to dominate popular narratives about civil 
litigation and tend to fuel reforms that affect all cases, rather than only the big cases”); see also 
Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the “Big Case,” 21 F.R.D. 45, 47 (1957); cf. Gluck, supra 
note 191, 1709-10. 
193. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and the Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004); ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND 12 (2018) (citing 
Stuntz’s article as one example of an approach that maintains that “statutorily authorized 
punishments and legal rules offer little guidance to the empirical regularities of existing crim-
inal courts and criminal punishment”). This comparative strength in criminal procedure may 
reﬂect the inﬂuence of sociology on the study of punishment more generally. See Tracey L. 
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Hausmann wrote in her recent study of low-level criminal courts in New York 
City, a bottom-up perspective insists that “legal actors always need to make a 
practical determination about what the law means in the ﬁrst instance in con-
strained situations of choice.”
194
 The forces that constrain these actors in crimi-
nal procedure constitute a logic of legal activity on the ground that “those at the 
top of various constitutive organizational hierarchies . . . [do not] necessarily in-
tend, plan, or even consciously embrace.”
195
 An insistence on studying how 
courts concretize formal rules on a daily basis often leads to a focus on run-of-
the-mill cases, many of which involve people with few resources. 
Criminal procedure’s greater emphasis on the experiences of poor litigants 
in court may derive from the fact that that procedural system requires appoint-
ment of counsel. This routine representation, guaranteed by Gideon v. Wain-
wright and its progeny, in turn, makes procedural lapses more evident.
196
 A bot-
tom-up approach recognizes that the criminal process on the ground does not 
 
Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 OR. L. REV. 391, 394-95 (2000) (drawing 
on sociological theory for an ecological understanding of poverty, crime, and marginaliza-
tion); Calvin Morrill et al., Seeing Crime and Punishment Through a Sociological Lens: Contri-
butions, Practices, and the Future, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 291 (contrasting European sociol-
ogy of crime’s “top-down” approach with the “long tradition in American sociology of 
‘bottom-up’ inquiry”). 
194. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 193, at 13; see also MONA LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS: THE CO-
ERCIVE POWER OF DRUG LAWS IN FEDERAL COURT 2-7 (2016) (arguing that the severity of fed-
eral drug laws allows prosecutors near-unilateral power to dictate punishments); Issa Kohler-
Hausmann, Jumping Bunnies and Legal Rules: The Organizational Sociologist and the Legal 
Scholar Should Be Friends, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 246, 266 (Sharon Dolo-
vich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) (discussing how the interplay of formal law and extra-
legal forces “generates a set of research questions about how legal rules are fundamentally 
always interpolated into the course of ongoing activity”). 
195. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 193, at 13; see also Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law 
of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303, 1373 (2018) (observing that “[f]ew scholars of 
American criminal justice doubt that such extralegal forces—ranging from resource imbal-
ances between prosecutors and defendants, to informal institutional norms and practices, to 
the complex power dynamics associated with race, gender, and class—produce sometimes-
sizable gaps between the criminal law codiﬁed on the books and the criminal law implemented 
on the ground”). 
196. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45 (1963); Thomas H. Cohen, Who Is Better at 
Defending Criminals? Does Type of Defense Attorney Matter in Terms of Producing Favorable Case 
Outcomes, 25 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 29, 35 (2014) (reporting defendant indigency rates of 
about eighty percent in felony cases). Of course, this contrast between civil procedure and 
criminal procedure is not to suggest that Gideon’s legacy is free of criticism. See, e.g., Eve 
Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1769, 
1769 (2016) (observing that “too many lawyers appointed to represent poor criminal defend-
ants do not perform their intended role in the system, because they have been conditioned 
not to ﬁght for their clients”). 
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square with our constitutional commitments.
197
 Criminal rules sound in a kind 
of constitutional formalism, lending themselves to a bottom-up perspective, 
whereas civil procedure, in its diffuse, technical nature, can appear less pliant.
198
 
Yet even administrative procedure, which resembles civil procedure more than 
criminal procedure in its statutory regime, has made more of this bottom-up 
perspective than civil procedure has. Scholars of administrative adjudication, like 
their counterparts in criminal procedure, have attended to the processing of a 
large number of claims, its implications for dispute resolution,
199
 and how it em-
powers street-level decision makers.
200
 Using the bottom-up approach, scholars 
of civil procedure could borrow from these two ﬁelds. 
 
197. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon’s Servants and the Criminalization of Poverty, 12 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 445, 449 (2015) (arguing that “the formalist Gideon framework . . . falls apart as a 
descriptive mechanism at the bottom”). 
198. William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
1, 4 (1996) (noting that “the provision of counsel and counsel’s performance, discovery, set-
tlements, the questioning of witnesses, the disposition of cases that don’t go to the jury—all 
issues that have been constitutionalized in criminal cases—are in civil cases governed by rules 
of civil procedure, by statute, by nonconstitutional common law, or by local custom.”); see 
also Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Pro-
cedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 777-78 (1997). But see Crespo, supra note 195, at 1310 (arguing 
that, to the contrary, there is a “surprising degree of procedural—and thus regulatory—heter-
ogeneity” in plea bargaining). 
199. See JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 3 (1983) (discussing the origin of the “due pro-
cess revolution” in administrative law); Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up 
Workplace Law Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1119 (2014) (arguing 
that “the current system of bottom-up workplace law enforcement relies too heavily on work-
ers themselves to be claims-makers”); Deborah E. Anker, Legal Change from the Bottom Up: 
The Development of Gender Asylum Jurisprudence in the United States, in GENDER IN REFUGEE 
LAW: FROM THE MARGINS TO THE CENTRE 46, 67 (Efrat Arbel et al. eds., 2014) (identifying “a 
ground-level jurisprudence that is having signiﬁcant impact on other aspects of refugee law 
and decision-making institutions including at higher levels”); Jonah B. Gelbach & David Mar-
cus, Rethinking Judicial Review of High Volume Agency Adjudication, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1148-
60 (2018) (discussing the results of a multiyear study of social security disability beneﬁts lit-
igation in the federal courts); Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic Administration: Experimentation 
and Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1177 n.13 (2016) (modeling “an inquiry into lower-
level expertise” that “has the beneﬁt of refocusing analysis on a critical expertise rationale for 
administrative action that has tended to erode over time.). 
200. See, e.g., MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY, at xii (1980) (relating how “the de-
cisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to 
cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry 
out.”); see also Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and 
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1129 (2000) (noting a “new administrative 
paradigm” that reﬂects “an increase in the power that ground-level administrators wield over 
beneﬁt recipients.”). 
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B. Whither Civil Procedure? 
In forma pauperis status is absent from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Yet it is a salient aspect of federal practice for poor litigants.
201
 That this quotid-
ian corner of civil procedure has gone unexplored for so long reﬂects, perhaps, 
the academy and the judiciary’s conception of the federal courts.
202
 The federal 
courts do not often concern themselves with how to borrow from the ways in 
which state courts and administrative agencies mete out justice to the masses. 
This insufficient attention to the experiences and interests of poor litigants has 
led to an underspeciﬁed accounting of access to justice in the federal system. 
This absence of attention on in forma pauperis rules and similar procedures 
is all the more glaring because of the recent attention scholars have directed at 
what they see as an increasingly degraded environment of civil procedure. They 
have observed various ways in which the quality of civil adjudication has de-
clined in recent years, including the disappearing
203
 and diminished
204
 trial, the 
lack of counsel,
205
 arbitration’s displacement of adjudication,
206
 the declining 
 
201. Burbank, supra note 175, at 715 (describing how “the banner of simplicity and predictability 
under which [the Federal Rules] ﬂy is by now false advertising” because “[l]itigants and 
courts need more guidance than the Federal Rules provide, and to ﬁnd it they must turn to a 
bewildering array of local rules, standing orders, and standard operating procedures, to say 
nothing of case law.”). 
202. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 184, at 1009 (discussing this neglect). The lack of attention is 
not limited to proceduralists. See Resnik, supra note 116, at 1831 (noting that at the “1995 Ju-
dicial Conference” there was concern “that the federal courts would become places for poor 
people and criminal defendants, rather than attract a mix of investments from a diverse set of 
litigants”); Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations 
and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 327 n.13 (2016) (noting that “[a] surprisingly small num-
ber of scholars have devoted sustained attention to the constitutional status of the poor”). 
203. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 
522 (2012). 
204. See, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Diminished Trial, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2131 (2018). 
205. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadﬁeld, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice 
System, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 953 (2000); Michael Zuckerman, Is There Such a Thing as an Afford-
able Lawyer?, ATLANTIC (May 30, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014
/05/is-there-such-a-thing-as-an-affordable-lawyer/371746 [https://perma.cc/HB2X 
-9UYW]. 
206. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil Litigation, 
65 EMORY L.J. 1491 (2016); Paul R. Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 963, 
983 (2005) (noting how the Supreme Court has characterized “arbitration as an alternative to 
judicial decisionmaking”). 
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quality of appellate hearings,
207
 and the fall of the class action.
208
 Some have 
drawn the ﬁeld’s attention to how these procedural phenomena impact substan-
tive law and, in turn, certain subsets of civil litigants.
209
 Some go so far as to say 
that the Supreme Court and the Judicial Conference have contributed to this de-
cline because they are overly solicitous of the needs of wealthy interests in civil 
litigation.
210
 
In the context of those worrying trends, this Article is an odd ﬁt. After all, 
the Article identiﬁes a chaotic corner of federal practice that is not new, but 
 
207. See, e.g., William M. Richman, Rationing Judgeships Has Lost Its Appeal, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 911, 
912 (1997) (identifying how appellate practice has “created different tracks of justice for dif-
ferent cases and different litigants”); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, 
Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 
273, 277 (1996) (“Federal appellate courts are treating litigants differently, a difference that 
generally turns on a litigant’s ability to mobilize substantial private legal assistance.”). 
208. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013); see 
also Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 844 (2016) (“It has become a 
commonplace to say that the class action is dying, or at least, that courts and lawmakers are 
trying to kill it.”); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 353 (2010); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil 
Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1853 (2014) (discussing “the attack on class actions”). For 
earlier prognoses of some of these phenomena, see Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory 
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 508 (1986); and Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghosts of 
Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1, 3, 23-30 (1988), which discusses whether the Rules have become “stingier.” 
209. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1470 (1987) 
(warning that “so long as discretion dominates procedure, procedure will dominate substan-
tive law”); Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 801, 818-22 (2010) (explaining how procedure can favor certain groups over others); 
Suzette Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough: Trans-Substantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and Its Detrimental Impact on Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 455, 484-508 (2014) (ar-
guing that civil rights claimants “have been hit particularly hard by increasingly restrictive 
applications and interpretations of Rule 23”); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of 
Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimina-
tion Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 520 (2010) (arguing that “the changing nature of pretrial 
practice” disproportionately affects “civil rights and employment discrimination cases”). 
210. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 184, at 1015-23 (2016) (discussing the role of the Judicial Con-
ference); Michele Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How the Supreme Court Contributes to 
Economic Inequality, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 389, 405-410 (discussing the role of the Supreme 
Court in this area); Arthur R. Miller, Simpliﬁed Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials 
on the Merits: Reﬂections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 304 
(2013) (describing the Roberts Court as having “placed a thumb on the justice scale favoring 
corporate and government defendants”); Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the 
Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 332 (2012) (concluding that the “Roberts Court has 
shown similar hostility to litigation as a means of vindicating legal rights” and that “this 
Court’s hostility manifests itself in general procedural doctrine”). 
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longstanding. Indeed, these baroque IFP determinations are an antiquated yet 
enduring feature of civil adjudication in America. Despite the scholarly alarm 
about the decline of civil procedure, this procedure, one directed by deﬁnition at 
poor people, has escaped notice. 
This Article offers a way out. The multitude of laments reﬂects a desire to 
move from a degraded to a digniﬁed procedure. This Article makes such a move. 
Although in forma pauperis status is only one aspect of federal practice, it illus-
trates how proceduralists might align civil adjudication in such a way that pro-
motes reasoned judicial administration and protects the interests of litigants. 
Much of procedural scholarship considers additional protections for poor lit-
igants (and access-to-justice reforms generally) to be at odds with the demands 
of rationalized judicial administration. The values of due process are understood 
to be in conﬂict with preserving judicial resources. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s 
leading case on procedural due process, Mathews v. Eldridge, requires that courts 
balance the private interests of individuals with the probable value of additional 
procedure and the government’s interests, which include the “ﬁscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedur[es] . . . would en-
tail.”
211
 When the Supreme Court decided Mathews, the Court and others were 
concerned with the costs associated with imposing trial-like procedures on fed-
eral administrative adjudication. However, that particular context has not 
stopped the Supreme Court and lower courts from relying on the test laid out in 
Mathews to determine the appropriate procedural protections for state civil pro-
ceedings involving the termination of parental rights,
212
 involuntary commit-
ment,
213
 maximum-security prisons,
214
 and incarceration for civil contempt
215
—
not to mention the federal procedures governing the detention of American cit-
izens in prisons maintained by the U.S. military.
216
 
 
211. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory In-
dependence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 468 (1986) (characterizing 
the Mathews test as requiring that “[t]he probable value of additional procedural safeguards 
in protecting an interest [be] weighed against the state’s ﬁscal and administrative burden in 
providing them”). 
212. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981). 
213. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 330 (1993). 
214. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005). 
215. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 444 (2011). But see Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 
168 (2002) (disclaiming that Mathews is “an all-embracing test for deciding due process 
claims”). 
216. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-29 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“The ordinary mecha-
nism that we use for balancing such serious competing interests, and for determining the pro-
cedures that are necessary to ensure that a citizen is not ‘deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
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This Article rejects the rights/resources trade-off inherent in the Mathews 
balancing test by proposing a procedure that better protects the interests of liti-
gants while still preserving judicial resources. In short, it proposes a procedure 
that reinforces both judicial administration and access to justice. In doing so, the 
Article departs from conceptualizing judges as managers in competition with 
private arbiters.
217
 Such a solution suggests that in this area of civil procedure, 
judges need not choose between preserving court resources and extending access 
to justice. Rather, in this instance and perhaps others, judges can serve both 
goals in the federal system. 
This Article, in part, urges judges to take back their time by streamlining a 
speciﬁc, fairly ministerial function. Judges’ skills are not always required to make 
IFP determinations. Federal law has created agencies that make poverty deter-
minations as a matter of course. Those determinations are routine and regular. 
Federal practice should build on those means tests in making IFP determina-
tions. Federal judges need not make complicated, arcane poverty determinations 
because such determinations do not necessarily demand adjudicatory expertise. 
It seems uncontroversial to assert that we should prefer that judges adjudicate 
disputes rather than compute a litigant’s resources. This proposal protects an 
Article III judge’s unique attribute—the capacity for reasoned, impartial adjudi-
cation.
218
 
A streamlined, shorter form also makes the process more sophisticated and 
more accurate while preserving the dignity of poor people. By taking advantage 
of adjunctive eligibility and an ex ante means test, this proposal would allow 
federal courts to preserve the dignity of IFP movants. A truly poor movant would 
not need to divulge every detail of her ﬁnancial situation (and other details like 
schooling) to receive IFP status. This Article’s analysis of in forma pauperis prac-
tice shows why the trade-off between procedural protections and judicial re-
sources is not inevitable. It suggests that these principles should not always be 
 
without due process of law’ is the test that we articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.” (citation 
omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V)). 
217. See Burbank, supra note 175, at 716 (identifying the two strategies that “have dominated recent 
efforts of the rulemakers and debate in the literature” as efforts “to enhance the power of trial 
judges to manage litigation” and efforts “to enhance incentives for people to avoid litigation”). 
218. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 435 (1982) (suggesting that 
“scarce judicial resources should be conserved and employed only when judges’ special skill—
adjudication—is required”). 
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treated as competing principles or “either/or” design choices, but rather as mu-
tually reinforcing features that legitimize a digniﬁed procedural system.
219
 This 
Article reconciles that apparent conﬂict in a speciﬁc instance: a poor litigant’s 
ﬁrst step into federal court. 
In addition to reconciling access-to-justice and judicial-administration com-
mitments, this approach also alters the aperture of the access-to-justice lens. Of-
ten, the literature on access to justice emphasizes the ways that legal rules and 
institutions deny entry to poor litigants in the ﬁrst instance or push them out of 
court on a technicality.
220
 However, this Article suggests that access to justice 
should include the ways in which poor litigants are treated once they enter the 
civil adjudicatory system. Put differently, suppose a litigant has a meritorious 
claim but also must clear bureaucratic hurdles in order to pursue that claim. And 
suppose those hurdles are only put in the way of litigants who are poor. That 
situation, which describes IFP determinations at a certain level of generality, 
should be considered an access-to-justice problem. In this light, IFP determina-
tions are yet another barrier in the realm of access to justice, but one that scholars 
have failed to see as such. A bottom-up approach to procedure expands the con-
cept of “dignity values,” which have typically been seen as “reﬂect[ing] concern 
for the humiliation or loss of self-respect which a person might suffer if denied 
an opportunity to litigate,” to include instances where a person is given the op-
portunity to litigate, but must do so in a way that is demeaning and irrational.
221
 
 
219. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3-25 (2004) (discussing trade-offs in reform 
attempts); Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fal-
lacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1107-08 (2012) (exploring why this perception of a 
trade-off between access and cost persists among judges and scholars). 
220. See SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL RE-
TRENCHMENT 219 (2015) (locating the development of the term “access to justice” in the 1970s 
by activists, the ABA, and the LSC). 
221. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One’s 
Rights—Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172. Over the last half century, other scholars have sought 
to articulate the values of due process. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24 (1979) (articulating the importance of a 
judge “assum[ing] a more active role in the litigation, to make certain that he is fully informed 
and that a just result will be reached”); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process 
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a 
Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 52 (1976) (noting that, in procedural systems, “[j]ustice 
in a formal philosophical sense is often deﬁned as equality of treatment”); Resnik, supra note 
218, at 430 (identifying three “values of due process” including “the accuracy of decisionmak-
ing, the adequacy of reasoning, and the quality of adjudication”); cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Admin-
istrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885, 899 (1981) (admit-
ting that “equality is a notoriously slippery concept, and its procedural implications are 
puzzling”). See generally Rubenstein, supra note 182, at 1915 (discussing this scholarship). 
pleading poverty in federal court 
1535 
A focus on how people with limited means conduct litigation may also alter 
ongoing conversations among proceduralists.
222
 For example, while bankruptcy 
procedure is thought of as a subset of civil procedure, a bottom-up approach to 
both civil and bankruptcy procedure may highlight meaningful discrepancies. 
Indeed, for bankruptcy proceedings, the topic of in forma pauperis status already 
raises interesting questions. Why, for example, did Congress create a parallel in-
digence determination for Chapter 7 debtors that embraces a bright-line means 
test? Is there some feature of bankruptcy proceedings that demands such a 
means test that other civil adjudication lacks? Put another way, should the fed-
eral courts treat poor people differently if they are in bankruptcy proceedings as 
opposed to other civil litigation? If so, in what ways? 
A bottom-up approach to the study of civil procedure could help scholars 
bridge conversations in civil procedure with those in other procedural domains 
like criminal and administrative adjudication.
223
 For instance, the line of inquiry 
for bankruptcy procedure laid out above could also be extended to criminal pro-
cedure. Rather than treating those doctrinal boundaries as impermeable, why 
not research poor litigants across procedural domains, civil and criminal?
224
 One 
 
222. Relatedly, civil procedure scholars have yet to embrace the emphasis on the role of social 
movements in shaping law, a mode of analysis that shares much with a bottom-up approach. 
See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, The Social Movement Turn in Law, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 360, 
364 (2018) (describing “how movement liberalism has been presented within legal scholar-
ship as a way of reasserting a politically productive relationship between courts, lawyers, and 
social change from the bottom up”). Legal historians have increasingly borrowed and con-
tributed to the broader historiography of social history. See TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COUR-
AGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 11 (2011) 
(arguing that “the relationship between law and social change looks different when viewed 
from the bottom-up perspective”); see also RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S (2016); KAREN M. TANI, STATES 
OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935-1972 (2016). 
223. See Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 
133 (2008) (arguing that the “civil-criminal procedural dichotomy is inappropriate for the 
realities of the twenty-ﬁrst century”). 
224. Courts often characterize civil procedure as appropriately deﬁcient compared to criminal pro-
cedure. The Supreme Court has justiﬁed this discrepancy in the relative lack of procedural 
protections for civil matters on the grounds that in those proceedings the interests at stake are 
not as serious. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (noting that “an 
indigent’s right to appointed counsel . . . has been recognized to exist only where the litigant 
may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation” and emphasizing that “it is the defend-
ant’s interest in personal freedom” that drives that result). But see id. at 41 n.8, 42 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for “emphasizing the value of physical liberty to the 
exclusion of all other fundamental interests” and “opting for the insensitive presumption that 
incarceration is the only loss of liberty sufficiently onerous to justify a right to appointed coun-
sel”); Douglas J. Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent’s Right to Counsel 
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application of this approach could put court fees in civil litigation in conversation 
with the renewed scholarly interest in bail.
225
 This approach would also recog-
nize that many poor individuals are in touch with not just one justice system, 
but multiple, sometimes simultaneously. 
No single article could fully cover this vast landscape of procedural scholar-
ship. Yet, by focusing on a single procedural rule, this Article offers a vantage 
point from which others may view the ﬁeld. Ideally, others will now have a few 
more tools and several more questions for studying procedure from the bottom 
up.
226
 
Furthermore, this shift to a study of procedure from the bottom up is not 
strictly academic. It is a shift with practical implications. The need for scholar-
ship on practices other than in forma pauperis pleadings is particularly urgent as 
there are other obstacles that poor people must confront to meaningfully access 
the federal courts. One could examine the Twiqbal revolution (or lack 
thereof).
227
 There is some evidence that the insertion of a plausibility standard 
into Rule 12(b)(6) disproportionately impacts poor litigants.
228
 This approach 
might also lend support to the new Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project 
that was implemented last year in the District of Arizona and the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois.
229
 Such a project has potential to level the playing ﬁeld for under-
 
After Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 FAM. L.Q. 205, 221 (1981)(“Lassiter, for all practical pur-
poses, stands for the proposition that a drunken driver’s night in the cooler is a greater dep-
rivation of liberty than a parent’s permanent loss of rights in a child.”). 
225. See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions According to Ability to Pay, 103 IOWA L. 
REV. 53, 73-95 (2017) (discussing how states have experimented with different ability-to-pay 
determinations in the context of bail); Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: Criminal Justice Debt 
& Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV. 486, 527 (2016); Crystal S. Yang, Toward an 
Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1472-73 (2017). 
226. Nor should this research be conﬁned to the federal courts. Civil litigation in state courts could 
also beneﬁt from careful study using this approach. 
227. See William H.J. Hubbard, A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading, 83 U. CHI. L. REV 693, 700 
(2016) (suggesting that “special care may need to be reserved for pro se and IFP plaintiffs in 
the application of pleading standards”). 
228. See id. at 740 (concluding that the Twiqbal empirical studies that include pro se and IFP cases 
“offer suggestive evidence that pro se and IFP plaintiffs are, in fact, more affected by pleading 
standards than represented plaintiffs” (citing Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal Rates of 
Federal Civil Claims, JUDICATURE, Nov./Dec. 2012, at 127, 130-32, 134)); see also Theodore Ei-
senberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Plaintiphobia in the Supreme Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 193, 
206-07 (2014). But see David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of 
Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1230-34 (2013) (laying out the limitations of empirical 
studies of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662 (2009)). 
229. See Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Project Overview, supra note 182; see also J. Maria Glover, 
The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1731 (2012) (pointing out that 
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resourced litigants in the discovery process. Indeed, the motivation for bottom-
up procedure stems not just from a suspicion that judges and scholars often ig-
nore problems speciﬁc to litigants with few resources, but also from the possi-
bility that a shift in focus might yield different methods for building more effi-
cient and equitable procedural systems. 
conclusion 
This Article has analyzed and contextualized what is ultimately an everyday 
problem in federal civil practice: the way federal courts require litigants to plead 
their poverty. In capturing the range of federal in forma pauperis determina-
tions, the Article explored how this specialized procedure could be made more 
coherent, easing the burdens on litigants and judges alike. To do so, the Article 
placed federal in forma pauperis determinations side-by-side with other means 
tests in federal law and with in forma pauperis determinations in the states’ court 
systems. Such a comparison suggests a promising new approach for federal prac-
tice. 
But in a larger sense, this Article is part of a broader inquiry into how in-
equality in America has impacted civil procedure. The hope is that this Article 
spurs some pressing questions about civil justice in the United States. In what 
other ways do procedural systems adhere to rudimentary practices that collide 
with the practical realities and interests of poor people? Are there other ways in 
which the federal courts have allowed civil procedure to channel poor litigants 
into a distinct procedural system? Does the United States now possess, in effect, 
a subsystem of civil procedure for litigants who happen to be poor?
230
 If so, to 
paraphrase Albert Camus, can we maintain our devotion simultaneously to the 
federal courts and access to justice?
231
 
The Article answers that last question in the affirmative. It identiﬁes a change 
to a procedural rule that would honor our commitment to the federal courts 
without sacriﬁcing our ﬁdelity to equal justice. We can serve both commitments 
of our procedural system—rational administration of the courts and access to 
 
“plenary discovery process also enables the imposition of signiﬁcant asymmetric costs upon 
plaintiffs”); sources cited supra note 182. 
230. See, e.g., D. VT. R. 45 (giving the district court discretion to “decline to subpoena a witness 
whose proposed testimony is immaterial or repetitive” only in in forma pauperis and pro se 
cases); Grostic, supra note 15 (recounting how a case brought by an in forma pauperis litigant 
was transferred to a particular judge per local administrative rule). 
231. Camus wrote, “I should like to be able to love my country and still love justice.” ALBERT CA-
MUS, LETTRES A UN AMI ALLEMAND 20 (1945) (“Et je voudrais pouvoir aimer mon pays tout 
en aimant la justice.”). 
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justice for all litigants. In forma pauperis status is only one instance. There may 
be others.  
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appendix a:  in forma pauperis practice in u.s.  district 
courts and state courts 
This Article analyzes all in forma pauperis forms used in the U.S. district 
courts. To conduct this analysis, I ﬁrst visited each of the ninety-four federal dis-
trict courts’ websites to determine if the court provided an online form. I col-
lected every form that was available and created a database of the forms. I noted 
whether the district court referred litigants to the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts, which provides both a long form (AO 239) and a short form (AO 
240) to ﬁle in forma pauperis. With the help of a research assistant, I contacted 
each of the ninety-four district courts’ clerks’ offices to determine whether they 
also accept the AO 239 and/or AO 240. We also asked the clerks’ offices to con-
ﬁrm whether the information and form listed on the courts’ websites were accu-
rate. We then reﬁned the list of district courts that use the AO 239, the AO 240, 
and/or their own district-speciﬁc form. The results of that research are reﬂected 
in Table 1. My research assistant and I then independently coded each of the dis-
trict-speciﬁc forms and reconciled the coding. We coded each of the forms across 
the following categories: 
 
1) Sources of Income: 
 Employment/Self-employment 
 Real property 
 Retirement (social security, pen-
sions, annuities, insurance) 
 Disability/Workers’ comp/Unem-
ployment payments 
 
 Public assistance 
 Interest/Dividends 
 Stocks/Bonds/Notes 
 Money owed to the movant 
 Inheritance/Trust funds/Gifts 
 
2) Expenses: 
 Rent/Mortgage 
 Utilities 
 Food 
 Medical 
 Transportation 
 Money owed by the movant 
 Insurance (speciﬁc categories) 
 Maintenance on home 
  
3) Other: 
 Schooling 
 Consulted with/Paid an Attorney 
 Children/Dependents 
 Taxes 
 Complaint ﬁled raises claims in 
other lawsuits 
 Filed case in same district 
 Cash on hand 
 Make and model of car 
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The results of the coding on sources of income, expenses, and other ques-
tions are included in Tables 2, 3, and 4 respectively. These tables only list districts 
that use their own forms. 
In the midst of this research, I decided to survey in forma pauperis rules in 
state courts as well. I had known that I would research state court systems for 
potential proposals to improve federal in forma pauperis practice. However, once 
I began this research, I thought it better to systematically code the state court 
rules, albeit on more limited grounds. To conduct this analysis, my research as-
sistant and I collected any state in forma pauperis statutes and the relevant state 
court rules. We replicated our procedures for the federal courts. We coded each 
state’s rules in four categories: (1) means tests; (2) adjunctive eligibility based 
on public beneﬁts; (3) eligibility based on representation by a legal aid attorney; 
and (4) some discretionary category such as “substantial hardship.” The results 
of the coding of the state court systems are included in Table 5. 
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TABLE 1.  
IN FORMA PAUPERIS FORMS IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS232233 
District Form 
Middle District of Alabama Both AO 239/240 
Northern District of Alabama Own  
Southern District of Alabama Own 
District of Alaska Own 
District of Arizona AO 239 + affidavit 
Eastern District of Arkansas AO 240 
Western District of Arkansas AO 240 
Central District of California Own 
Eastern District of California AO 240 
Northern District of California Own 
Southern District of California AO 239 
District of Colorado AO 239 
District of Connecticut Own 
District of Delaware AO 239 
District of Columbia AO 240 
Middle District of Florida Both AO 239/240 + affidavit  
Northern District of Florida Own 
Southern District of Florida Both AO 239/240 
Middle District of Georgia AO 239 
Northern District of Georgia AO 239 
Southern District of Georgia AO 240 
District of Guam AO 240 
District of Hawaii AO 240 
District of Idaho Own 
Central District of Illinois Both AO 239/240  
 
232. The following tables include both Article III district courts and Article I federal district courts 
for Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. See 48 U.S.C. §§ 1424, 1611, 
1821 (2018). 
. 
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District Form 
Northern District of Illinois Own  
Southern District of Illinois Own 
Northern District of Indiana Own 
Southern District of Indiana Both AO 239/240 + own 
Northern District of Iowa AO 240 
Southern District of Iowa AO 240 
District of Kansas Own 
Eastern District of Kentucky Both AO 239/240 
Western District of Kentucky Own 
Eastern District of Louisiana AO 240 + affidavit 
Middle District of Louisiana Both AO 239/240 + affidavit 
Western District of Louisiana Own 
District of Maine AO 240 
District of Maryland AO 239 + affidavit 
District of Massachusetts AO 240 + affidavit 
Eastern District of Michigan AO 240 
Western District of Michigan AO 239 
District of Minnesota Own 
Northern District of Mississippi AO 240 
Southern District of Mississippi AO 239 
Eastern District of Missouri Own 
Western District of Missouri Own 
District of Montana AO 239 
District of Nebraska AO 240 
District of Nevada AO 240 
District of New Hampshire AO 239 + own 
District of New Jersey AO 239 
District of New Mexico AO 239 
Eastern District of New York AO 240 
Northern District of New York AO 240 
Southern District of New York Own 
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District Form 
Western District of New York Own 
Eastern District of North Carolina AO 239 
Middle District of North Carolina AO 239 + own 
Western District of North Carolina Both AO 239/240 
District of North Dakota Own 
District of the Northern Mariana Islands AO 239 
Northern District of Ohio Own 
Southern District of Ohio Own 
Eastern District of Oklahoma Own 
Northern District of Oklahoma Own 
Western District of Oklahoma Own 
District of Oregon Own 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania AO 239 
Middle District of Pennsylvania AO 240 
Western District of Pennsylvania Both AO 239/240 
District of Puerto Rico AO 240 + affidavit 
District of Rhode Island Own 
District of South Carolina AO 240 
District of South Dakota Both AO 239/240 
Eastern District of Tennessee Own 
Middle District of Tennessee AO 239 
Western District of Tennessee AO 239 
Eastern District of Texas Own 
Northern District of Texas AO 239 
Southern District of Texas AO 240 
Western District of Texas AO 239/240 + own 
District of Utah AO 240 
District of Vermont AO 239/240 + affidavit 
District of the Virgin Islands Own 
Eastern District of Virginia AO 239 
Western District of Virginia Both AO 239/240 
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District Form 
Eastern District of Washington Own 
Western District of Washington Own 
Northern District of West Virginia Own 
Southern District of West Virginia Own 
Eastern District of Wisconsin Own 
Western District of Wisconsin Own 
District of Wyoming  AO 239 
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TABLE 5.  
IN FORMA PAUPERIS RULES IN THE STATE COURTS 
State Means-test  
(FPL%) 
Legal aid 
waiver 
Adjunctive eligibility 
(public beneﬁts) 
Discretionary  
standard 
Alabama    * 
Alaska  *  * 
Arizona * 
(150%) 
* * 
(TANF, SNAP) 
* 
Arkansas *   * 
California * 
(125%) 
 * 
(Medicaid, SNAP, 
TANF, General Assis-
tance, SSI, State Supple-
mentary Payment, Tribal 
TANF, In-Home Sup-
portive Services, or Cash 
Assistance Program for 
Immigrants) 
* 
Colorado * 
(125%) 
*  * 
Connecticut * 
(125%) 
 * 
(“Public assistance” in-
cluding, but not limited 
to General Assistance, 
TANF, AABD, SNAP, or 
SSI) 
* 
Delaware    * 
District of  
Columbia 
  * 
(SSI, SNAP, TANF,  
and Medicaid) 
 
Florida * 
(200%) 
 * 
(TANF, poverty-related 
veterans’ beneﬁts,  
or SSI) 
* 
Georgia    * 
Hawaii    * 
Idaho  *  * 
Illinois * 
(125%) 
 * 
(SSI, AABD, TANF, 
SNAP, General  
Assistance, Transitional 
Assistance, or Family As-
sistance) 
* 
Indiana  *  * 
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State Means-test  
(FPL%) 
Legal aid 
waiver 
Adjunctive eligibility 
(public beneﬁts) 
Discretionary  
standard 
Iowa * 
 
  * 
Kansas    * 
 
Kentucky 
 
* 
(determined 
by Kentucky 
Supreme 
Court) 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
Louisiana * 
(125%) 
 * 
(“Public assistance  
beneﬁts” but does not 
specify) 
* 
Maine   * 
(speciﬁes “poverty-
based” public beneﬁts) 
* 
Maryland * 
 
*  * 
Massachusetts * 
(125%) 
 * 
(Medicaid, TANF, 
AABD, SSI, or  
Veterans’ Beneﬁts) 
* 
Michigan * 
(125%) 
 * 
(SSI, TANF) 
* 
Minnesota * 
(125%) 
* * 
(TANF, SSI, Medicaid, 
MinnesotaCare, Medi-
care Part B or Part D, 
Low Income Home  
Energy Assistance  
Program, or SNAP) 
* 
Mississippi    * 
Missouri * 
(125%) 
*  * 
Montana * 
(133%) 
  * 
Nebraska * 
(125%) 
 * 
(TANF, AABD, poverty-
related veterans’ beneﬁts, 
SNAP, refugee beneﬁts, 
Medicaid, SSI, or Gen-
eral Assistance) 
* 
Nevada  *  * 
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State Means-test  
(FPL%) 
Legal aid 
waiver 
Adjunctive eligibility 
(public beneﬁts) 
Discretionary  
standard 
New  
Hampshire 
 *  * 
New Jersey * 
 
*  * 
New Mexico * 
 
 * 
(TANF, General Assis-
tance, SSI, SSDI,  
Veterans’ disability bene-
ﬁts if sole source of in-
come, SNAP, Medicaid, 
public-assisted housing, 
or Department of 
Health, Case Manage-
ment Services) 
* 
 
New York  *  * 
North  
Carolina 
 * * 
(TANF, SSI, SNAP) 
* 
North  
Dakota 
* 
(125%) 
 * 
(TANF, SSI, Medicaid) 
 
Ohio    * 
Oklahoma    * 
Oregon    * 
Pennsylvania  *  * 
Rhode  
Island 
   * 
South  
Carolina 
 *  * 
South  
Dakota
234
 
    
Tennessee * 
(125%) 
   
Texas  * * 
(“Government entitle-
ment program”) 
* 
Utah * 
(150%) 
  * 
Vermont 
 
 
 
* 
(150%) 
 * 
(Beneﬁt “must be signif-
icant to income”) 
* 
 
234. I could not ﬁnd any in forma pauperis application or standard in South Dakota law or in the 
state’s court rules. 
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State Means-test  
(FPL%) 
Legal aid 
waiver 
Adjunctive eligibility 
(public beneﬁts) 
Discretionary  
standard 
Virginia * 
(125%) 
 *  
Washington * 
(125%) 
* * 
(TANF, Housing and 
Essential Needs, SSI, 
Federal poverty-related 
veterans’ beneﬁts, 
SNAP) 
* 
West  
Virginia 
*   * 
Wisconsin * 
(125%) 
* * 
(“Means-tested public 
assistance” such as 
TANF, General Assis-
tance, Medicaid, SSI, 
SNAP, and veterans’ 
beneﬁts) 
* 
Wyoming    * 
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appendix b:  proposed in forma pauperis form235 
 
 
235. The author and publisher expressly disclaim any copyright ownership in this IFP form. How-
ever, all other contents of this Article are protected under copyright law and are the exclusive 
property of the author and publisher.  
